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THE PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE
SHE MAN L. CoRN*
After a discussion of the history of uniform procedural rules and the
authority of the Supreme Court to promulgate uniform appellate rules,
Professor Cohn discusses some of the problems of expense and delay which
are found in the appellate system today. In his analysis of the Proposed Uni-
form Rules of Federal Appellate Procedure, the author gives special empha-
sis to those areas where the rules constitute a departure from present prac-
tice. In addition, several changes are suggested in areas in which the author
believes further improvement can be made.
In 1960 the Chief Justice of the United States, acting pursuant to
a 1958 congressional grant of authority to the Judicial Conference
of the United States,1 appointed an advisory committee2 to study
the advisability of establishing uniform rules of. federal appellate
procedure. Because the statutory authorization to the Supreme
Court to promulgate uniform civil rules is limited to rules for the
district courts," it is doubtful that the Supreme Court now has the
authority to promulgate general uniform rules for the appellate
courts4 -although the Court clearly has the authority to promulgate
appellate rules governing appeals in criminal and Tax Court cases,5
and the Judicial Conference has the authority to "approve" uniform
* Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. B.S.F.S., LL.B.,
LL.M., Georgetown University.
The author, until September 1963, was Assistant Chief, Appellate Section, Civil Division,
United States Department of Justice. He is chairman of the Appellate Rules Committee
of the Federal Bar Association. Although he is solely responsible for the contents, much
of the article was compiled while the Appellate Rules Committee studied the proposed
appellate rules. The author is indebted to those members of the committee who assisted
in this task. He is also indebted to Mr. Gerald Laughlin of the Journal and Mr. Andrew
D. Merrick, third-year student at the Law Center, for research and editorial assistance of
the highest caliber.
128 U.S.C. § 331 (1964).
2 This was the Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules to the Standing Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States. The
chairman of the Advisory Committee is Senior Circuit Judge E. Barrett Prettyman of the
District of Columbia Circuit.
8 Act of June 19, 1934, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1964).
4 For a discussion of the Court's rulemaking authority see pp. 436-38 infra.
5 18 U.S.C. §§ 3771-72 (1964) (criminal cases) ; 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (1964) (tax cases).
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rules governing procedure in administrative review cases.' The Ad-
visory Committee, nevertheless, in March 1964 completed the Pre-
liminary Draft of Proposed Uniform Rules of Federal Appellate
Procedure. It is this writer's understanding that, after receiving
comments from the bar, the Advisory Committee recommended
to the Standing Committee on Rules and Practice of the Judicial
Conference and that committee recommended to the Conference
itself certain changes to those portions of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which,
although governing procedure in the district courts, are a part of
the appellate process.7 The Conference in turn has approved these
recommendations for submission to the Supreme Court, As the
procedures affected are those prior to the docketing of the case in
the court of appeals, the matters concerned clearly fall within the
authority granted the Court by Congress. It is this writer's further
understanding that as of this writing the Advisory Committee has not
submitted to the Standing Committee on Rules its recommendations
concerning procedure after docketing. A major factor in this di-
chotomy may be the lack of statutory authority for uniform rules of
appellate procedure in civil cases.
A bill to expand the authorization of the Judicial Conference to
include uniform rules of appellate procedure is now pending in Con-
gress.8 It is unknown at this time whether the final version of the
Proposed Uniform Rules of Federal Appellate Procedure will be
publicly released prior to the enactment of the authorizing legislation.
The purpose of this article is to discuss the significant changes which
the preliminary draft of the Advisory Committee would make in
appellate procedure. Before analyzing the preliminary draft of the
Advisory Committee it is helpful to examine the history of earlier
uniform federal rules as well as the present appellate rulemaking
authority of the Supreme Court. It would also be helpful to examine
the federal courts of appeals themselves and some of their problems of
congestion, delay, and expense. While uniform appellate rules will
not be a panacea for such problems, it would be well to consider the
proposed rules within the perspective of today's situation. An ob-
jective of such consideration should be to eliminate, as far as is prac-
6 64 Stat. 1132 (1950), 5 U.S.C. § 1041 (1964).
7 FED. R. Civ. P. 73-76; FED. R. CRIM. P. 37-39.
8 H.R. 7538, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). At the close of the first session, this bill was
in committee, but no action had been taken.
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ticable, any element in present practice that contributes unnecessarily
to these problems. A proposed change that will result in the consump-
tion of more court time, more attorney time, or more expense should
be accepted only after the most thorough deliberation demonstrates
that such a change is fully justifiable for other compelling and over-
weighing reasons.
HISTORY
Prior to 1938 the procedure of the federal district courts in ac-
tions at law was required to conform to the local state practice.9 In
1937 the Supreme Court, acting under a 1934 congressional grant
of authority,10 promulgated the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."
The rules, which established uniform procedure for all civil cases
at law and in equity in the federal district courts, became effective
the following year.'2
The 1938 Federal Rules were not, however, the first uniform rules
of federal procedure. Indeed, the 1934 act was not the first con-
gressional grant of authority for the promulgation of such rules
by the Court. As early as 1792 Congress made a grant of permanent
rulemaking authority to the Court by subjecting the law, equity, and
admiralty procedure to "such alterations and additions as the [cir-
cuit and district courts] . . . shall in their discretion deem expedient,
or to such regulations as the supreme court of the United States shall
think proper from time to time by rule to prescribe to any circuit
or district court concerning the same . . .'1 In 1842 the authoriza-
tion of the Court to prescribe general rules of federal procedure was
repeated in broader terms:
[T]he Supreme Court shall have full power and authority, from time to time,
to prescribe, and regulate, and alter, the forms of writs and other process to
be used and issued in the district and circuit courts of the United States, and
the forms and modes of framing and filing libels, bills, answers, and other pro-
ceedings and pleadings, in suits at common law or in admiralty and in equity
pending in the said courts, and also the forms and modes of taking and obtain-
ing evidence, and of obtaining discovery, and generally the forms and modes
of proceeding . . . before trustees appointed by the court, and generally to
regulate the whole practice of the said courts, so as to prevent delays, and to
9 Conformity Act, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 197 (1872).
10 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1964).
11302 U.S. 783 (1937).
22 FED. R. Civ. P. 86 (a).
13 Permanent Process Act, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 276 (1792).
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promote brevity and succinctness in all pleadings and proceedings therein, and
to abolish all unnecessary costs and expenses in any suit therein.14
The Court first exercised its rulemaking power in 1822 when it
promulgated uniform federal equity rules.", These rules were com-
prehensively revised and reissued in 184216 and 1912.17 In 1844
the Court promulgated uniform Admiralty Rules' s which were com-
pletely overhauled in 1920.1' The 1792 and 1842 congressional
authorization regarding the promulgation of rules for actions at
law, however, was never exercised.
The willingness of the Court to establish rules for both equity and
admiralty while failing to do so for actions at law may be explained
by the disparity in development of these three areas in the early
days of the Republic. Whereas the states had well-established pro-
cedure for actions at law, equity was little used or entirely nonexist-
ent in the courts of many states,2° and a procedure was never de-
veloped for admiralty in state courts.2' Thus, for many federal courts
there was no state equity procedure to follow, and for all federal
courts there was no state admiralty procedure to guide them. Perhaps
on this basis, the Court believed that, although uniform federal pro-
cedure was appropriate for equity and admiralty, it was more ap-
propriate "to yield, rather than encroach" upon state common-law
procedure.2
Notwithstanding the appropriateness of such a policy, the failure
of the Court to exercise its rulemaking powers in the common-law
field proved detrimental to the effective functioning of the federal
14 Act of Aug. 23, 1842, ch. 188, § 6, 5 Stat. 518.
15 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) at xvii (1822).
161 How. atxli (1842).
17 226 U.S. 627 (1912).
18 44 U.S. (3 How.) at ix (1844).
19254 U.S. 671 (1920). The rules became effective March 7, 1921.
20 See generally Mississippi Mills v. Cohn, 150 U.S. 202 (1893) ; HART & WECHSLER, THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 578 (1953); SCOTT & SIMPSON, CASES ON CIVIL
PROCEDURE 161-63 (1951); Wilson, Courts of Chancery in the A4merican Colonies, in 2
SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 779 (1908).
21 See U.S. CONST. art III, § 2; The Hine v. Trevor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 555 (1867); The
Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411, 431 (1867). Compare the practice under the Articles
of Confederation set forth in 3 WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES 1339, 1347 (2d ed. 1929). The "savings-to-suitors" clause, § 9 of the Judiciary Act
of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 76 (now 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1964)), permits only state common-law
suits and not state admiralty actions. Thus no state admiralty procedure evolved.
2 2 Fullerton v. Bank of the United States, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 604, 614 (1828).
434
1966] PROPOSED APPELLATE'RULES 435
courts. The deficiencies became progressively more apparent fol-
lowing the Court's construction of the 1792 act so as to require
federal courts to utilize state procedure "as it existed in September,
1789 . . . not as it might afterwards be made."' 3  As state pro-
cedures evolved, the federal courts were forced to conform to out-
moded procedural rules. Congress attempted some piecemeal amel-
ioration, 24 but basically the federal procedure was limited to what
Professor Charles Allan Wright called "static conformity" to "state
practice as of September 29, 1789 . . . regardless of changes which
the states might thereafter have made. ' 25
The disparity between federal and state procedure intensified as
many states abandoned common-law procedure altogether and
adopted a version of the Field Code of 1848.28 When the Court
failed to act under the power it undoubtedly had to keep federal pro-
cedure apace with changing views and conditions, Congress responded
by rescinding that power, thus removing from the control of the
Court the procedure of the district courts in actions at law. This
was accomplished by the Conformity Act of 1872 which prescribed
that:
[T]he practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding, in other than
equity and admiralty causes in the circuit and district courts of the United States
shall conform, as near as may be, to the practice, pleadings, and forms and modes
of proceeding existing at the time in like causes in the courts of record of the
State within which such circuit or district courts are held . . . .27
The Conformity Act precluded any rulemaking activity by the Court
in the common-law field until the passage of the Act of 193428 which
restored that power to the Court. The 1934 grant of authority
resulted in the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Throughout this earlier period little was done concerning criminal
rules although the Supreme Court had such rulemaking power. Pro-
fessors Hart and Wechsler term the criminal procedure of this era
a "hodgepodge" of common-law practice, constitutional provisions,
federal legislation, and references to state law.29 In 1933 Congress
23 Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 32 (1825).
2 4 E.g., Act of May 19, 1828, ch. 68, 4 Stat. 278; Act of Aug. 1, 1842, ch. 109, 5 Stat. 499.
25 WRIGHT, FEDERAL CouRTs 220 (1963).
26 N.Y. Laws 1848; ch. 379. For a list of states which have adopted code procedure,
together with the date of adoption see CLARK, CODE PLEADING 24-25 (2d ed. 1947).
27 Conformity Act, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 196 (1872).
28 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1964).
20 HART & WECHSLER, op. cit. supra note 20, at 581.
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authorized the Court to promulgate rules concerning proceedings
after verdict.30 Such rules were issued the next year."' It was not
until 1940 that Congress granted the Court authority to set down
procedural rules for criminal proceedings prior to and including
verdict,3 2 and not until 1946 were such rules promulgated.
83
Little was done concerning appellate procedure although, again,
the Supreme Court had the power to act. The 1792 and 1842 acts
authorized the Court to prescribe rules for the circuit courts as well
as the district courts,"4 and the circuit courts had appellate jurisdic-
tion over the decisions of the district courts.35 But, except for certain
equity rules, 6 this power was not exercised.
THE PRESENT AUTHORITY OF THE COURT To PROMULGATE
UNIFORM APPELLATE RULES
The late Judge Charles E. Clark, Reporter of the Advisory Com-
mittee on Rules for Civil Procedure of the United States Judicial
Conference-the committee that drafted the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure-argued in 1936 that the Conformity Act of 1872 did
not withdraw the power of the Supreme Court to make uniform
rules of federal appellate procedure.3 T This argument was based
upon the premise that, while the 1842 act extended to the appellate
jurisdiction of the circuit courts, 88 the Conformity Act "removed
the procedure of the district courts in actions at law from the
control of the Supreme Court,"39 leaving intact the rulemaking power
of the Court over appellate cases in the circuit courts. This analysis
proves too much, however: the same language from which it could
be argued that the 1842 act gave the Supreme Court rulemaking
power over the appellate cases within the circuit courts' jurisdiction,
30 Act of Feb. 24, 1933, ch. 119,47 Stat. 904 (now 18 U.S.C. § 3772 (1964)).
81292 U.S. 661 (1934).
32 Act of June 29, 1940, ch. 445, 54 Stat. 688 (now 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1964)).
33 327 U.S. 821 (1946).
84 See notes 13 & 14 supra and accompanying text.
85 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, §§ 11, 21, 22, 1 Stat. 79, 83, 84; see W.iuiT, FIDE AL
Cou s 34 (1963).
36 Clark, Power of the Supreme Court To Make Rules of Appellate Procedure, 49 HAry.
L. REv. 1303, 1316-18 (1936).
S7 Id. at 1310-21.
38 See text accompanying note 14 supra.
89 Clark, supra note 36, at 1315.
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is found within the 1872 act which withdrew that power as far as
common-law cases were concerned.40
When Congress in 1934 authorized the Supreme Court to pro-
mulgate uniform rules of federal civil procedure, it limited that
authorization to cover the procedure "for'the district courts of the
United States and for the courts of the District of Columbia." 4' The
provision authorizing the Court to issue admiralty rules is likewise
limited to procedure "in the district courts. ' 4 2 The authorization for
criminal rules goes further. It empowers the Supreme Court to pre-
scribe rules of practice and procedure "with respect to any or all pro-
ceedings after verdict, or finding of guilt by the court if a jury has
been waived, or plea of guilty, in criminal cases . . . in the United
States district courts, . . . in the United States courts of appeals, and
in the Supreme Court of the United States." 43
Thus, although the Court does possess rulemaking authority for
criminal appellate procedure,4 it is doubtful that such power presently
exists for the Court to promulgate uniform appellate rules in the civil
field. Therefore, unless and until the authorizing legislation is passed
by Congress, the Court will not be able to act on the Proposed Draft
40 The applicable language of the 1842 act, see text accompanying note 14 Jupra, should
be compared with the appropriate language of the Conformity Act, see text accompanying
note 27 supra.
It is noteworthy that each of the examples referred to by Judge Clark concern either
equity or the power of the Supreme Court over the procedure governing appellate matters
in its own court. As to the former, examples of equity cases do not show that the Supreme
Court had power to issue rules involving law appeals in the circuit courts after 1872.
And the latter falls within the Court's power to regulate its own procedure. Judiciary Act
of 1789, ch. 20, § 17, 1 Stat. 83.
4128 U.S.C. § 2072 (1964-).
42 28 U.S.C. § 2073 (1964).
43 18 U.S.C. § 3772 (1964).
44 FED. R. Cium. P. 37 prescribes the form of notice of appeal and the time for taking
an appeal to a court of appeals, and refers to the rules of the Supreme Court for appeals
and certiorari petitions taken to that Court. Rule 38 pertains to stay of execution and
other relief pending appeal. Rules 39(b) and (c) set forth requirements for the prepara-
tion of the record and its docketing with the court of appeals. Only rule 39 (d) prescribes
a matter of appellate procedure: requiring that criminal cases be given preference on
the calendar, to be heard not less than thirty days after docketing but as soon thereafter
as the calendar will permit. Rule 39(a) provides that, except as the rules otherwise pro-
vide, "the supervision and control of the proceedings on appeal shall be in the appellate
court from the time the notice of appeal is filed with its clerk . . . ." Thus in large
measure the Supreme Court has delegated its rulemaking power to the individual appellate
courts.
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of Uniform Rules of Federal Appellate Procedure when it is com-
pleted.
TODAY'S FEDERAL APPELLATE SYSTEM
This apparent lack of concern for appellate procedure might
partially be explained by its past inconsequentiality when compared
with trial procedure. The volume of appellate litigation is much
smaller than that of the trial court;45 hence, a narrower segment of
the bar and the public are directly affected. More important is the
pressing need which has existed for reform in the trial court. Even
at its worst, appellate procedure does not cause the difficulties that
are encountered at the trial level. Only now that the district courts
have achieved relative uniformity and comparative simplicity in
their procedure and have a continuing program for further improve-
ment46 is there an opportunity to concentrate on appellate procedure.
In recent years the case load of the federal appellate courts has
increased significantly. In fiscal 1947, for example, there were but
2,615 cases docketed in the appellate courts 7 compared with 6,766
cases in fiscal 1965.48 The median time for completing federal ap-
pellate cases which go to argument or submission has risen to eight
months. 49 Thus, one-half of the cases take longer than eight months
45 In fiscal year 1965, for example, while there were commenced in the district courts
some 67,678 civil, 31,569 criminal, and 180,323 bankruptcy matters, there were but
6,766 matters docketed in the courts of appeals. 1965 DIRECrOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF THE U.S. CouRTs ANN. REP. pp. 11-2, 11-9, 11-19, V-1 (preliminary print)
[hereinafter cited as 1965 REPORT].
46 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1964) now provides in pertinent part:
The [Judicial] Conference shall also carry on a continuous study of the operation
and effect of the general rules of practice and procedure now or hereafter in use as
prescribed by the Supreme Court for the other courts of the United States pursuant to
law. Such changes in and additions to those rules as the Conference may deem de-
sirable to promote simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration, the just determi-
nation of litigation, and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay shall be
recommended by the Confefeice from time to time to the Supreme Court for its con-
sideration and adoption, modification or rejection, in accordance with law.
The suggested revisions may be put into effect through the procedures of 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2072-75 (1964) and 18 U.S.C. §§ 3771-72 (1964).
47 1956 DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. CouRTs ANN. REP. 109
[hereinafter cited as 1956 REPORT]. The number of appeals filed in 1940 was 3,446. A
gradual decline lasted through 1947 when 2,615 appeals were filed. The number then
began to increase. By 1956 there were 3,588 cases docketed. Ibid. By 1963 the number
had climbed to 5,437. It reached 6,023 in 1964. 1965 REPORT p. 11-4.
48 This constitutes a rise of 12.3% over 1964. Ibid.
49 Id. at 11-7. In fiscal 1964 the median time was 7.4 months. At the end of thq 1965
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to complete. To grasp the full magnitude of this growing problem of
delay, however, one must analyze the factors from which the median
figure is derived. One interesting aspect is the large variance in the
median figure from circuit to circuit. While in the Eighth and First
Circuits the median time is 5.6 and 5.8 months respectively, in the
Fifth and Sixth Circuits it is 10.0 and 11.2 months respectively. 50
Even more significant is the fact that some case categories are given
preference over others. Criminal appeals, for example, are to be
heard "as soon after the expiration of [thirty days after docketing]
. . . as the state of the calendar will permit." The law requires that
"preference shall be given to appeals in criminal cases over appeals in
civil cases." 51 A right of preference exists as well for many adminis-
trative appeals. 2 Thus, the ordinary civil case in the Sixth Circuit
is now coming to argument nine to ten months after all briefs are filed
and twelve to thirteen months after docketing. 'In the Fifth Circuit
argument in ordinary civil cases is being scheduled some ten to
eleven months after briefs are filed and fourteen to sixteen months
after docketing. When one includes an additional one to twelve
months for decision,53 and makes allowance for the fact that the
case may not have been docketed until two to five months after the
district court dec'ision,54 the problem appears to be greater than
fiscal year the number of appeals pending on the dockets of the courts had risen to a
record high of 4,775-which is equal to almost 83% of the total, number of cases termi-
nated by the appellate courts this past year and more than one and one-third times the
number of cases terminated after argument or submission. See id. at 11-4, 11-6.50 Id. at 11-7.
51 FED. R. CRIM. P. 39 (d).
52 Appeals from the NLRB "shall be heard expeditiously, and if possible within ten
days after they have been docketed." 49 Stat. 455 (1935), 29.U.S.C. § 160(i) (1964).
FTC cases are'also to be given precedence. 38 Stat. 720 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 45(e) (1964).
5 As of June 30, 1965, there were 197 cases under submission for more than three
months. Of these, 32 had been under submission from 6 to 9 months, 10 others, from 9
to 12 months, and 13 for more than a year. 1965 REPoRT p. 11-8. 'It should be noted that
these figures are the cases under submission on June 30, 1965; they 'do not reflect cases
decided prior to that date that had been under submission for more than three months.
54 In ordinary civil cases a notice of appeal must -be filed within 30 days of' final deci-
sion. Should the United States or an officer or agency thereof be a party to the civil action,
the appeal may be noted within 60 days of decision. In admiralty there are 90 days
available from a final decision. 28 U.S.C. § 2107 (1964). Almost one-third of-all ordi-
nary civil cases commenced involved the United States (21,651 of 67,678) and thus were
subject to the 60-day appeal period. 1965 REPoIT, Table C-1. -
. Once a notice of appeal ig filed there are normally 40 days 'in" which to docket the
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the eight-month median first indicates. While preference to criminal
matters is not to be deprecated, one must ask if it is necessary that
it should take one and one-half to two years to prosecute an appeal
in a civil case.
A major -cause of this congestion is the lack of an adequate num-
ber of judges to deal with the increasing case load. On June 30,
1965, for example, there were only 74 active judges on the federal
courts of appeals to deal with the 6,766 filed cases. 5  In 1956, on the
other hand, to deal with only 3,588 filed cases there were 68 ap-
pellate judges, and in 1947, when there were only 2,615 cases filed,
59 judges were authorized to hear them.5 6 Even this is not the
entire story, however. The number of judges varies from circuit to
circuit. The First Circuit, for example, is authorized three judges,
while the Second, Fifth, and Ninth are authorized nine apiece.57
The number of cases commenced per authorized judge in fiscal 1965
varied from 62 in the Third Circuit and 70 in the First Circuit to
114 in the Sixth Circuit, 118 in the Fifth Circuit, and 122 in the
Fourth Circuit.58 The number of cases terminated after hearing
or submission per authorized judge in fiscal 1965 varied from 28 in
the Eighth and 30 in the Third to 69 in the Fifth.50 The circuit with
the longest median time of disposition, the Sixth Circuit, disposed
appeal. This period may be extended by the district court for another 50 days. FED. R.
Crv. P. 73(g). It is normal practice in most circuits not to transmit the record from the
district court to the appellate court until close to the end of the period permitted. Except
for a few isolated district courts, it is only in the First Circuit that as a matter of course
the record is transmitted to the appellate court immediately after the filing of the notice of
appeal. Even in those instances, however, a private appellant may obtain a postponement
,of docketing time (which starts time running for briefing, etc.) by failing to pay the
docketing fee. The government, of course, not being subject to that fee has no such
flexibility. From this author's experience he has concluded that with the exception of a
few district judges, the granting of a motion for extension of docketing time from 40 to
90 days after the noting of an appeal is practically automatic.
55 1965 REPoT p. 1-10.
56 1956 REPORT 109.
5T2S U.S.C. § 44 (1964).
58The 1965 REPORT p. 11-2 gives a chart showing the total number of cases com-
menced in each circuit during the year. The number of cases commenced per authorized
judge is easily computed. See 28 U.S.C. § 44 (1964) for the number of authorized judges
in each circuit.
59 The 1965 REPORT p. MY-7 gives a chart listing the number of cases terminated in each
circuit during the year. The number of cases terminated per authorized judge is easily
computed. See 28 U.S.C. § 44 (1964) for the number of authorized judges in each circuit.
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of 50 cases per authorized judge in fiscal 1965.60 These figures do
not take into account vacancies, illness, use of retired and district
judges, and use of visiting judges from other circuits,61 but even with
these unknowns, it is apparent that at least a large part of the cur-
rent problem must be laid at the door of Congress for permitting
a substantial time lag between increased judicial business and the
authorization of increased personnel.62 Should the case load continue
to increase 3 with only the piecemeal increase in judgeships prevalent
today, the congestion could result in appellate delay approaching
that of even the busiest trial courts.6 4
Thus, the procedures of the appellate courts are not the only
cause of delay. There are, however, procedural practices which con-
tribute to this problem. For example, the Second Circuit still requires
that judges hear oral argument on every motion that is made. This
practice seems to be unnecessary for formal motions, such as those
for extensions of time. The better practice, and the practice in most
courts today, is to have these motions submitted without argument.
Moreover, most formal motions are unopposed. In such a situation,
if the grant of the motion would not prejudice the calendar of the
court or materially affect progress of the case, there would seem to
be little justification for not permitting court clerks to act,65 thus
saving the time of all judges concerned. This is a practice which exists
informally in a number of courts today. Judge time is too precious
to be spent on nonessentials. Again, the Tenth and Fifth Circuits
60 See note 59 supra.
61 Authority is provided for such assignments by 28 U.S.C. §§ 291-94 (1964).
62 A bill to authorize additional appellate judges was passed by the Senate. S. 1666,
89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). No further action has been taken since that time, however.
The bill provides for two additional circuit judges for the Fourth Circuit, two for the
Sixth, one for the Seventh, and one for the Eighth Circuit. The bill would also authorize
four additional judges for the Fifth Circuit on a temporary basis.
63 In fiscal 1965, filings in the Ninth Circuit increased 35%, in the Fourth Circuit 31%,
in the Sixth 23%, and in the Second 20%; the pending caseload in the Fifth Circuit alone
at the end of the fiscal year was 933. 1965 REoRT p. 1-2.
64 The median time for completing a civil case in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
was forty-one months. 1965 REPORT, Table C 10.65 To allow subordinate court personnel to perform duties involving less than substan-
tive matters is one manner of attacking the problem of congestion. Court commissioners
have been recommended to fill this role. Breen, Solutions for Appellate Court Congestion,
47 J. Am. JuD. Soc'y 228, 229-30 (1964). In practice, however, the courts have been taking
on additional duties instead of lightening the load. Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of
Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. Rav. 751 (1957).
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require the appellate record to be reproduced prior to briefing. This
practice, which delays briefing and hence argument by one to five
months, is not deemed necessary in other circuits. If court calendars
are reasonably current, this time lag causes unnecessary delay in the
progress of the case.
A' close corollary of the.problem-6f delay is the expense factor.
Every additiohal paper required to be filed by an attorney, 6 every
additional hour spent in court, and every peculiarity of procedure
that must be learned increases cost of litigation. It is instructive to
count the number of attorneys sitting in the Second Circuit court-
room on motion day and then multiply by 25 dollars per hour
(minimum), add the cost of traveling both in time and fare from
western New York or northern Vermont or Chicago or Boston or
Washington, just to argue motions for extensions of time. On one
such motion day the author counted fifty-four attorneys who by
rough calculations stay' d for an average of one and one-half hours
(motions calendar- took the entire morning). The maj6rity of time
was -spent listening to cases called in which there were motions for
extensions of -time, most of which were unopposed. It would seem
that much of this expense of litigation, whether chargeable to the
client directly or as a part of overhead, constitutes a needless waste.Another practice which might be mentioned as an example of
needlessly increasing the expense of litigation is the requirement of
the First Circuit that all briefs be printed. 6T Thus, those who prac-
tice in that court are unable to use the newer and cheaper methods
of reproduction that all other courts have found satisfactory. 8
In addition to the delay andexpense factors, the changing nature of
the appellate practice suggests the feasibility of uniform appellate
rules. As we have become a national society, our litigation has become
more national in scope. It is not at all rare today to find an attorney
representing his client in several courts around the country. Nor is it
6 6 The "mountains" of printed material necessary for alpeal constitute "one of our
major barriers against justide" dnd ard "a great economic waste." Wilcox, Karlen &
Roemer, Justice Lost-By What Appellate Papers Cost, 33 N.Y.U.L. REV. 934 (1958).
67 lsr CIR:R 23(6).
68 Although the rules of the Fourth Circuit require that all briefs be printed, 4= CR.
R. 10(7), that court will' permit on motion the filing of'a multilithed brief. All 6ther
circuits permit the use of multilith or other new process. 2D Cli. R. 15(f); 3D CIR. R.
24(8) ; 5TH Cut. R. 23(a) (10) ; 6TH CIR. R. 17(1) ; 7TH CIa. R. 16"(g) ; 8TH CIR. R. 12(f);
9TH CIR.R. 37(A) ; 10nru CIP. R. 17(1) ; D.C. CIR.R. 18(f).
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rare to find both sides in a case represented by counsel who normally
practice outside the circuit.69
In this situation it is difficult to justify formal differences from
court to court within the federal system, yet today such differences
exist to a substantial degree. There are differences on such matters
as color of paper and cover,70 time for filing, 1 number of pages
permitted, 72 the manner of stating the questions before the court, 73
and the inclusion of special statements or certificates.7 4  In "addi-
tion, there are substantial differences in the manner of presenting
the record to the court in a useable form.7 5 As litigation is evolving
today, there is little reason for perpetuating these differences, for they
lie as traps for the unwary. At best they are causes of expense in the
litigation process, for the attorney is forced to research and assimilate
different rules as he focuses upon different courts within the same
federal system.
It is within the context of these problems that uniform rules should
be examined. They should be designed, of course, to alleviate as
many of the problems as is practicable within the aim of appellate
procedure. Certainly, they should not aggravate these problems except
where absolutely necessary.
THE PROPOSED APPELLATE RULES
In compiling the preliminary draft of the Uniform Rules of Federal
Appellate Procedure, the Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules
69 See Short, Travelling the Circuits, in 28 U.S.C.A., UNITED STATES CouRTS OF APPEALS
RULES 1 (1956).
70 In the District of Columbia Circuit the cover of appellant's brief is to be light blue;
of the appellee's brief, light gray; of the reply brief, light yellow or buff; of an inter-
venor's brief, light green. D.C. CIR. R. 14(a). In the Seventh Circuit the cover of ap-
pellant's brief is to be light yellow; of the appellee's brief, light blue. 7iiH CiR. R. 16(h).
While the color of the paper of the brief is specified to be only opaque and unglazed in
ten of the circuits, e.g., D.C. CIR. R 16(a), the Tenth Circuit requires India eggshell
paper, 10TH CIR. R. 17.
71 Compare lsT CiR. R. 23 (8) w ith 4'H CiiR. K 12(1) (A).
72 The maximum size of the appellant's brief varies from 50 pages, STH CiR. R. 24(2) (e),
to 80 pages, 6TH CiR. R. 16(8).
73 Compare 6TH CIR. R. 16(2), (4) and 87H CiR. R 11(b) (Fourth) s.ith 2D CIR. R.
17(a) and lsT C .R 23(3) (b), 23(4).
7 4 The Fifth Circuit's requirement of a certificate of service, STH..CiR. R. 24 .(1); (3),
(4), is unique in the federal appellate system.
75 See notes 128-32 infra and accompanying text
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considered the rules of the various federal appellate courts and bor-
rowed from each court's experience. Thus, the rules as proposed
will mean a change in practice for each appellate court. Moreover,
the draft focuses upon and suggests solutions for certain inequities
in the law that no circuit has yet treated. In this respect it represents
a departure from the previous practice of all the courts.
The remainder of this article contains a general summary of the
more significant proposed appellate rules with special emphasis on
those areas in which the rules constitute a departure from present
practice. In addition, there is a critical analysis of some areas in
which this author believes that further improvement can be made.
The proposed rules are grouped into specific areas in order to simplify
discussion.
NOTING AN APPEAL-PROPOSED RULES 3-5
The proposed rules retain the simplified method of noting an
appeal now provided in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure." These rules substituted
the simple notice of appeal for the more cumbersome requirements
of the practice which had previously existed.7 7 The proposed rules,
however, do make several significant departures from present practice.
One of the most significant departures concerns the time for tak-
ing an appeal in a civil case. Under present law, the period permitted
for noting an appeal in civil cases is jurisdictional. That is, if the
notice of appeal is not filed with the clerk of the district court within
the time limit provided,"8 the appellate court has no jurisdiction to
hear the appeal.79 This is based upon the principle that "litigation
must at some definite point be brought to an end."8 10 The only ex-
ception presently provided by statute or rule is if a party shows
76 FED. R. Crv. P. 73 (a); FED. R. CRIu. P. 37(a) (1).
7T See Advisory Committee Notes to FED. R. Civ. P. 73 and FED. R. CpiM. P. 37. See also
WRIGHT, FEDERAL CotnTe 406 (1963).
78 This would be thirty days in ordinary civil cases, sixty days in cases in which the
government or an officer or agency thereof is a party. 28 U.S.C. § 2107 (1964).
79 Spengler v. Hughes Tool Co., 169 F.2d 166, 167 (10th Cir. 194) ; Federal Deposit
Ins. Corp. v. Congregation Poiley Tzedeck, 159 F.2d 163, 166 (2d Cir. 1946); see FTC
v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 344 U.S. 206, 213 (1952) ; Matton Steamboat Co.
v. Murphy, 319 U.S. 412, 415 (193); cf. 7 MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcricE 73.10, at 3151 (2d
ed. 1955).
80 FTC v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., suPra note 79; see Matton Steamboat
Co. v. Murphy, supra note 79.
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"excusable -neglect based on failure . . . to learn of the entry of
the judgment, order or decree," and even then only a thirty-day
extension may be granted.8' These rules apply as well to cross-appeals.
The appellee, although he may defend ' the judgment upon any ground
appearing in the record, even if rejected in the district court 8 2 may
not seek affirmative relief enlarging his judgment unless he has filed
his own notice of appeal within the time limits provided.8 Thus, if
the appellee does not wish to appeal unless his opponent appeals,
and his opponent notes an appeal at the last moment, or for some
other reason the appellee fails to learn of his opponent's appeal
until the jurisdictional time has run, he is precluded from cross-
appealing.84
The proposed rules remedy the latter situation. Borrowing from
Illinois practice,8 , rule 4(a) provides: "If a timely notice of appeal
is filed by a party, any other party may file a notice of appeal within
7 days of the date on which the first notice of appeal was filed . ..."
As the Advisory Committee Note points out, additional time for
cross-appeals is common in state practice.80
One problem that arises is that the present time-limit requirement
is statutory.8 7 Thus, this provision cannot be adopted without a con-
8128 U.S.C. § 2107 (1964) ; FED. R. Civ. P.73 (a).
82Jaffke v. Dunham, 352 U.S. 280, 281 (1957); Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531, 538
(1931) ; United States v. American Ry. Express Co., 265 U.S. 425, 435 (1924) ; Frey &
Son v. Cudahy Packing Co., 256 U.S. 208, 210 (1921).
8a International Milling Co. v. Brown S.S. Co., 264- F.2d 803, 804- (2d Cir. 1959);
Guiberson Corp. v. Equipment Eng'rs, Inc., 252 F.2d 451, 432 (5th Cir. 1958).
8 4 At the writing of this article Mr. Justice Black is faced with a similar question involv-
ing the Supreme Court's jurisdiction. After the Fifth Circuit decided Florida E.C. Ry. v.
United States, 348 F.2d 682 (5th Cir. 1965), petition for cert. filed, 34 U.S.L. WEEK 3202
(U.S. Nov. 29, 1965) (Nos. 750, 782, 783), partially in favor of the United States and par-
tially in favor of the railroad, the United States on the ninetieth day after the Fifth Circuit
decision applied to Mr. Justice Black for an extension of time in which to file a petition for
a writ of certiorari. The time to file a petition, as the time for noting an appeal, is jurisdic-
.tional, Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399, 418 (1923); 28 U.S.C.
. 2101(c) (1964), but it may be extended upon application. Ibid. The railroad, on the
ninety-seventh day, applied for an extension of time in which to file a cross-petition. After
the government questioned the authority to grant an application filed late, Mr. Justice
Black, on November 10, 1965, ruled: "Motion granted if within my power to do so." It
thus appears that the jurisdictional question is deferred to full consideration by the Court
provided the petitions for certiorari are not denied.
8 ILL. SuP. Cr. R. 5. -
8 0 Advisory Committee Note to proposed rule 4(a).
87 28 U.S.C. § 2107 (1964).
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gessional grant, of authority that would include a provision similar
to 28 U.S.C. § 2072, which provides in the case of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure that all laws in conflict with the rules "shall be
of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect." There
can be little doubt that the time for noting an appeal is procedural
and not a "substantive right" which the "rules shall not abridge,
enlarge or modify," as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2072.
Another problem with the new provision that could cause injustice
in a few situations and that could easily be prevented with no appar-
ent disadvantage lies in the fact that the appellee's additional seven
days in which to cross-appeal runs from the "filing" of the first
notice. The other parties would know of the filing of the 'first notice
only by being served by the clerk of the district court, as is now
required by Rule 73 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Should the clerk not serve the other parties on the same day that
he receives the first notice, the appellees may not have an opportunity
to file within the time limit. This difficulty could be alleviated by
providing that the seven days shall run from the filing and service
of the first notice. Service, as it will be pointed out later, is complete
on mailing.8  For example, should a notice of appeal be filed late
on a Friday and the district court clerk not place a copy into the mail
to the other party until Monday, and should the other party be some
hundreds of miles away or across country, it is entirely possible-and
at the Christmas season quite probable-that the other party will not
be aware of the filing of a notice of appeal until after it is too late
to file notice-within the seven days allowed. This difficulty could be at
least alleviated by providing that the seven days shall run from 'the
filing and service of the first notice.
Another very significant change which proposed rule 4(a) would
work relates to the extension of time to take an appeal. As has been
noted, present law provides that this time may be extended upon
-motion only for "excusable neglect based on' failure of a 'party to
learn of the entry" of the order appealed from. 89 The new rules
would remove the limitation of failure to learn of the entry of the
.order and permit extension of time to note an appeal whenever there
is "excusable neglect." The Advisory Committee observes that in
8 8 Proposed rule 25(c).
8928 U.S.C. § 2107 (1964); FED. R. Civ. P. 73 (a). But see Wolfsohn v. Hankin, 376
U.S. 203 (1964); Thompson v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 375 U.S. 384 (1964);
Harris Truck Lines, Inc. v. Cherry Meat Packers, Inc., 371 U.S.'215 (1962). .
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view of the simple method of taking an appeal, no reason other than
failure to learn of the judgment should ordinarily be the basis of
such an extension. But, in its opinion, "the district court should have
authority to permit the notice to be filed out of time in extraordinary
cases where injustice would otherwise result." Although removing
the limitation upon the excusable neglect exception would permit
district courts in a few instances to prevent injustices that would
otherwise occur, the resulting uncertainty is too heavy a price to pay.
The entire basis for a limitation on the appeal period is that litiga-
tion must end at some time so that one can act safely upon a decision.
As long as a party has knowledge of the judgment, this period should
not be extended. By permitting the exception to apply whenever "ex-
cusable neglect" is found, the matter is left to the almost unlimited
subjective judgment of a district court judge.90
The Advisory Committee proposes that the time to appeal admi-
ralty cases be made uniform with the requirements for general civil
cases. 91 This is in conformity with the proposal of the Advisory
Committee on Admiralty Rules that much of the distinction between
admiralty and civil procedure be abolished.92 The proposed new rules,
however, retain two exceptions in the time to appeal, which in rea-
son do not appear to require such distinction-appeals of a bank-
ruptcy decision (forty days rather than thirty in certain situations)93
and appeal of an arbitration board award under the Railway Labor
Act (ten days).94 The Advisory Committee points out that each of
these exceptions is statutory.95 If this should be the only ground for
retaining such diversity, and none other is suggested, the Advisory
Committee is violating its own logic by proposing a change in the
time to appeal admiralty decisions and civil cases involving cross-
appeals, for both of these situations are now governed by statute.96
Since it seems clear that these are procedural matters and therefore
90 See id.
91 The time to appeal in admiralty is now ninety days after final orders and fifteen days
after interlocutory orders. 28 U.S.C. § 2107 (1964).
92 See Advisory Committee Note to proposed rule 4(a).
93 In bankruptcy, appeal time is thirty days after notice to the losing party of the entry
of judgment or order if proof of service of that notice is filed within five days of the
service itself. If there is no service or proof of service within the requisite time, appeal
time is forty days. Bankruptcy Act of 1938, § 25, 52 Stat. 855, 11 U.S.C. § 48 (1964).
9444 Stat. 585 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 159 (1964).
9 5 Advisory Committee Note to proposed rule 4 (a).
90 2S U.S.C. § 2107 (1964).
19661
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54: p. 4 3 1
within -the Court's rulemaking power, to retain these disparities is
to forego an opportunity to effect needed uniformity with no concurrent
disadvantage. Because "many actions which are termed bankruptcy
actions in common speech are regarded as ordinary civil actions for
the purpose of determining the time within which an appeal may be
taken,197 the law as it now stands serves as another pitfall for the
unwary.
The proposed rules for noting an appeal in a criminal case generally
adhere to those used today. The ten-day period for appeal is re-
tained.98 However, proposed rule 4(d) does change and clarify
existing law since it incorporates two principles that have evolved
through case law. A motion for leave to appeal in forma pauperis
filed within ten days of judgment is to be treated as a notice of
appeal,99 and a notice of appeal filed before judgment, but after
announcement of a decision, sentence, or order, is treated as filed
after judgment.100 The rule resolves the question whether a post-trial
motion, filed within ten days but beyond the filing time limit of the
applicable criminal procedure rule, 101 allows an additional ten days
for filing the appeal if the post-trial motion is denied. The Fifth
Circuit has held that such a motion does not extend the time ;102 the
Tenth Circuit has disagreed. 103 The proposed rule allows an exten-
sion only when the motion is "timely," thus adopting the position
of the Fifth Circuit. Moreover, it expressly provides that a motion
for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence extends the appeal
time only if filed within the ten-day period. This is significant because
the criminal procedure rules permit two years for such a motion.104
9 7Advisory Committee Note to proposed rule 4(b); see Diaz v. Crom, 195 F.2d 517
(5th Cir. 1952) ; In re Finklestein, 102 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1939) ; Exchange Nat'l Bank v.
Meikle, 61 F.2d 176, 178 (9th Cir. 1932); 2 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 25.02 (Moore ed.
1964). As bankruptcy proceedings have become available to more and more people, the
limited, specialized bankruptcy bar has expanded and there is more and more chance of
substantial rights being lost in the pitfall of different time periods. The number of bank-
ruptcy cases filed has increased from 18,510 in 1948, to 180,323 in 1965. See 1965 REPORT
p. v-1.
98 FED. R. CRIM. P. 37(a) (2).
99 See Black v. United States, 269 F.2d 38, 40 n,2 (9th Cir. 1959) ; Tillman v. United
States, 268 F.2d 422 (5th Cir. 1959).
100 Lemke v.,United States, 346 U.S. 325, 326 (1953).
101 FED. R. CRIM. P. 33-34.
102 Lott v. United States, 280 F.2d 24, 27 (Sth Cir. 1960), reqv'd on other grounds, 367
U.S. 421 (1961). The Supreme Court refused to decide the instant question.Id. at 425.
103 Smith v. United States, 273 F.2d 462, 464-65 (10th Cir. 1959).
104 Fa. R. Canm. P. 33.
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The proposed rule also resolves a conflict between the District of
Columbia Circuit,05 on the one hand, and the Second 0 6 and Fifth'07
Circuits, on the other, by providing that the time to appeal starts to
run not at the time of sentencing but at the time judgment was filed
and entered in the docket. Also, proposed rule 4(d) eliminates the
previous failure-to-learn-of-judgment limitation on the excusable-ne-
glect exception.108 Here there is less reason for an inflexible rule
since the necessity of ending litigation so that private persons may
act upon the judgment is not present in a criminal case.
Finally, proposed rule 5 would change the method of taking an
interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (b). The rules of most
circuits today provide for the filing of a notice of appeal after the
appellate court grants an application for permission to appeal. 0 9
Proposed rule 5 recognizes that such a notice of appeal is superfluous
and dispenses with it.110
PENDENTE LITE RELIEF-PROPOSED RULE 8
Most circuit courts have not laid out in their rules the procedure for
obtaining relief during the pendency of an appeal, although most
make reference to such relief, usually by prescribing which parts of
the record are to be used for such purpose. There can be no question
of the authority of the appellate courts to grant a stay or injunc-
tion pendente lite; such authority clearly lies within the All Writs
Statute.1
105Richards v. United States, 89 U.S. App. D.C. 354, 356, 192 F.2d 602, 604 (1951).
100 United States v. Isabella, 251 F.2d 223, 225 (2d Cir. 1958).
107 Hyche v. United States, 278 F.2d 915, 916 (5th Cir. 1960).
108 See pp. 44647 supra where this problem is discussed in connection with the civil
procedure rules.
109 D.C. CIR. R. 9',4; 2n CiL R. 10(d) ; S CIR. R. 11(2); 4TH CiR. R. 35; 6TH CiR. R.
8(2) ; 7TH CiR. R. 10(b), (d) ; 8TH CiR. R. 28; 9T CIR. R. 38; 10TH CIR. R. 12.3.
110 Unlike most of the current circuit court rules on the point, proposed rule 5(b),
setting forth the contents of the application for permission to take an interlocutory appeal,
omits a reference to the statutory requirement that the question presented be a "controlling
question of law." 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1964). While it is not necessary that the rules spell
out the statutory requirements, the rule as proposed does specify comparable requirements
by providing that the application include "a statement of the reasons why a substantial
basis exists for a difference of opinion on the question and why an immediate appeal may
materially advance the termination of litigation." By omitting the statutory requirement
that the question be "controlling," the rule may suggest that that condition of the statute
is unnecessary and thereby cause confusion. It is hoped that this is merely an oversight that
will be corrected before the rules are actually proniulgated.
11128 U.S.C. § 1651 (1964), Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 9-10
(1942), In re McKenzie, 180 U.S. 536, 551 (1901).
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The problem of seeking interim relief on appeal arises with some
frequency; time is usually of the essence. In addition to the advantage
of promoting uniformity, a rule governing applications for stays and
other interim relief would be of particular usefulness to an inexperi.
enced counsel who must obtain quick relief for his client.
Proposed rule 8 generally prescribes the same procedure which is
followed today. 12 A motion for such relief may be made to the
appellate court or to an appellate judge, but it must show that the
district court turned down an application for such relief, that action
of the district court did not afford the relief requested, or that applica-
tion to the district court is impractical. The motion is to state reasons
and, "if the facts are subject to dispute," is to be supported by affida-
vits or other sworn statements. Relevant portions of the record are
to be filed with the motion. "Reasonable" notice is to be given all
other parties. And the relief granted by the appellate court may be
conditioned upon the giving of a bond or other appropriate security
in the district court.'
The proposed rule, however, appears deficient in two major ways.
First, the provision that the motion shall be supported by affida-
vits or other sworn statements "if the facts are subject to dispute"
is vague and subject to unnecessary argument. If a court must act
hastily and on an incomplete record, there should be no question as
to the facts presented to it. Thus, it would be better if the rule were
to provide that the motion is to be supported by sworn statements
unless the pertinent facts were conceded in the district court or are
shown by the district court order or record.
Second, except for the cryptic statement that reasonable notice
shall be given to all parties, the proposed rule makes no reference
to procedure to be followed upon the filing of a motion for interim
relief. For the guidance of both counsel and clerks, as well as for
uniformity of treatment, it would be well to set out such a procedure,
perhaps patterned upon Rules 50 ( 1)- (3) of the Rules of the Supreme
Court."3
112 For present practice see Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 260 U.S. 212, 219 (1922) ; United States v. EI-O-Pathic Pharmacy, 192 F.2d 62,
79-80 (9th Cir. 1951) ; United States v. Hansell, 109 F.2d 613, 614 (2d Cir. 1940) ; FED.
R. CpiM. P. 38 (c).
113 Thus, the rule would provide that the motion should be filed with the clerk who Is
to transmit it to the court or an individual judge. It should be accompanied by proof of
service, including in urgent cases proof of telegraphic dispatch. Request for oral argu-
ment, if desired, should accompany the motion.
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This procedure could also be utilized in a provision for pendente.
lite-relief requests in proceedings in which courts of appeals directly
review administrative decisions. This form of relief is often requested
and granted; it is unfortunate that the proposed rules do not provide
a procedure for this situation.
APPEAL RECORD AND DOCKETING--PROPOSED RULES 10-12
The proposed rules recognize the obsolescence of Rules 75 (a)-(g)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which provide for the for-
warding to the court of appeals of certified copies of designated
portions of the district court record. No court now follows this
procedure. Thus, proposed rule 10(a) provides that the record
on appeal shall consist of the original papers and exhibits filed in the
district court, along with the transcript of proceedings, if any, and
a copy of the docket entries. The appellant is given the duty by rule
10(b) to order the portions of the transcript he will need. This
order must be placed within ten days of the filing of the notice of
appeal, a procedure now followed in the Fifth Circuit.- 4 Should
the appellant fail to order the entire transcript,"5 he is to file and
serve on the appellee a statement of the issues that he intends to
present on appeal. This statement, the Advisory Committee Note
makes clear, is not the equivalent of the once-required but now obsolete
assignment of errors, nor are the issues on appeal limited to those set
forth in the statement." 6
1 1 4 5TH CIR..R. 23 (3).
115 On numerous occasions an appellant who orders only a portion of the transcript
raises the question of sufficiency of the evidence. Naturally, the record in this posture will
support his conclusion. It is thus necessary to engage in a complex series of motions in
the court of appeals and the district court to force the appellant to provide the additional
transcript. Much time and effort are consumed. To eliminate this problem, the rules
ought to contain an explicit statement that if insufficiency of evidence is to be asserted
on appeal, all of the evidence in any.way.pertaining to that issue must be transcribed.
See Watson v. Button, 235 F.2d 235, 238 (9th. Cir. 1956) ; United States v. Brodbeck, 139
F.2d 916 (3d Cir. 1944) ; Miller v. Miller, 72 App. D.C. 348, 350, 114 F.2d 596, 5§8 (1940).
110 This factor points up an area in which the rules might be improved. In present
practice there are instances in which the appellant's brief presents broader or additional
issues to those detailed in his statement of issues. As noted in the text, the statement of
issues filed under proposed rule 10(b) is not intended to be binding upon the appellant.
If the appellant in his brief should go beyond the statement of issues which he has filed,
and if the appellee, because he relied upon the statement of issues, failed to counter-
designate portions of the transcript needed to answer the questions raised in the appellant's
brief, the appellee could presumably seek to have the record supplemented under the pro-
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The time for sending the record to the appellate court has been
altered. Rule 73 (g) now provides that the record is to be "filed with
the appellate court and the appeal there docketed within 40 days from
the date of filing the notice of appeal." Proposed rule 11 (a) would
require only that the record be "transmitted" to the appellate court
within that time. The Advisory Committee Note states that this
alteration in language was intended to change the procedure so that
it will be sufficient if the record leaves the possession of the district
court clerk on its way to the appellate court within the forty-day limit,
rather than requiring an actual filing of the record within forty days.
Thus, district courts which are located substantial distances from
their appellate court (e.g., from Alaska to San Francisco) would not
need to send the record substantially before the expiration of the
time.
Another change made by the proposed rules deals with the dis-
trict court's authority to extend the time in which to transmit the
record. At present, rule 73 (g) provides that the district court has
the discretion to extend the time for filing the record to a time not
more than ninety days from the date the appeal was noted. No limita-
tion is put upon that discretion, except that the order must be made
before the expiration of the time for filing and docketing as originally
prescribed or as previously extended. In criminal appeals the district
court may extend the time "for cause shown.' 1 7 No time limit is
imposed. Proposed rule 11(c) retains the same civil and criminal
time requirements, but with an alteration. In either type of action
a motion for extension must "show that the inability of the appellant
to cause timely transmission of the record is due to causes beyond
his control or to circumstances which may be deemed excusable
neglect."
There is reason, however, for retaining the present procedure
of an unconditioned forty-day period and an unlimited discretion on
the granting of extensions in civil cases-which in all but a few dis-
tricts means an almost automatic grant of a motion to extend the
time. Counsel often use much of the ninety-day period to resolve
questions of whether the appeal will be pursued. Bearing on these
vision made for that purpose by proposed rule 10(e). But that would apparently be at
the expense of the appellee. It would be much fairer to place the burden on the appellant
to have the record supplemented when he files a statement of issues which turns out to be
misleading.
117 FED. R. Cium. P. 39 (c).
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questions often is the possibility of settlement without appeal. Thus,
restricting the grant of extension motions and shortening the forty-
day period may well cause the transmittal of many records in cases
for which appeals will never be prosecuted.
It should also be noted that by retaining the forty-day period
in rule 11(a) the proposed rules fail to adopt the First Circuit
practice which requires transmission of the record upon its com-
pletion, even if before the fortieth day. This latter policy is aimed
at eliminating all delays possible in the appeal process.
Proposed rule 11(d) permits the court of appeals to provide by
rule or order that the original record be kept in the district court
subject to the right of any party to request at any time that designated
parts of the record be transmitted to the appellate court. This adop-
tion of an Eighth Circuit practice would alleviate the problem pre-
sented when parties need to consult the record for the preparation
of the appendix and briefs and find that it has been transmitted to a
court of appeals which may be many hundreds of miles away. On
the other hand, the court or a party frequently has need to examine
the record at the time of argument. This need is often not contem-
plated until the time of argument when, under the proposed rule, it
would be too late to request that the record be then transmitted. It
would therefore appear to be better practice to have the record sent
to the appellate court at the time of argument unless either the district
court or the court of appeals should otherwise direct.
Docketing, which is, of course, something separate from the filing
of the record, is accomplished under proposed rule 12 (a) by the clerk
entering the appeal on the docket of the appellate court. Any docket-
ing fee (currently twenty-five dollars) must be paid within the time
allowed for transmission of the record. Proposed rule 12 (c) provides
that should the appellant fail to docket or cause the transmission of
the record in time, the appellee may move for a dismissal of the appeal.
By providing that the appellant, upon payment of the fee, may "ap-
pear" in response to a dismissal motion, the rule implies that there will
be argument on such a motion. This is unfortunate. A similar practice
in the Fourth Circuit, where the court's rules are construed to require
oral presentation of all motions to dismiss, results in unnecessary ex-
pense and effort by appellee's counsel when he moves to dismiss an
appeal because of appellant's failure to docket. The better practice is
to require no oral presentation by the appellee unless the appellant an-
swers and the court directs argument.
19661 453.
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The rule also provides that, instead of filing a motion to dismiss,
the appellee may cause the record to be transmitted and may docket
the appeal. The appeal shall then proceed as if the appellant had
caused its docketing. This provision serves no useful purpose. Where
the appellant has apparently abandoned his appeal but has not taken
the trouble to have it dismissed, the proposed provision would permit
the appellee to obtain a determination upon the merits instead of hav-
ing the-appeal dismissed. In effect, this permits the appellee to obtain
a decision when there is no longer a real case or controversy and the
court has no jurisdiction in the matter. If the appellee has cross-
appealed, he should, of course, be allowed to proceed upon the merits
of his own appeal.
FILING AND SERVICE-PROPOSED RULE 25
Proposed rule 25 (a) provides that all "papers required or per-
mitted to be filed must be placed in the custody of the clerk within the
time fixed for filing.""18 Papers may be mailed, but filing is not timely
"unless the papers are actually received within the time fixed for
filing." This procedure is designed to prevent counsel from taking an
extra day or two to complete his papers before mailing them for filing,
but this approach penalizes the vast majority of counsel who conscienti-
ously try to follow the rules. In today's appellate practice, papers are
filed by mail, and unfortunately, the mails are not always dependable.
Counsel who in the best of faith mail briefs or other papers with what
normally would be sufficient time for their arrival, may find that they
are late. Since rarely, if ever, will it matter to the court if a brief is
actually received on the thirty-first or thirty-second rather than the
thirtieth day, there seems little reason for such a harsh rule.
Yet, it is recognized that time limits must exist, for otherwise the
judicial process could drag on interminably. The solution suggested is
to require the paper to be mailed in sufficient time to arrive in normal
course at the clerk's office within the time fixed and to require the proof
of service (which must be filed with the paper under rule 25 (d)) to
state the date of mailing to the court. Should the paper arrive late,
the clerk may require the filing of an affidavit from counsel or the
mailer showing the date of actual mailing."19
118 A slight variation occurs when a motion requests relief which may be granted by a
single judge. In that situation the judge may permit the motion to be filed with him
under proposed rule 25 (a).
119 Except for the District of Columbia Circuit, the clerks of the various appellate courts
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Proposed rule 25 (b) goes on to require that all papers filed by. any
party and not required to be served by the clerk shall be served, at or
before filing, by the filing party on all other parties to the case. It
should be noted that service is required upon all other parties, and
not just those that counsel may consider adverse. Service may be made
by mail, in which case it is complete upon mailing. Proof of service
is required. Although the proposed rule appears to. require that papers
presented for filing "shall contain" an acknowledgment of service or
proof of service, the remainder of the rule and the Advisory Com-
mittee Note make it clear that proof of service may be either on the
document served or accompanying it. The requirement of some
courts1 20 that if proof of service is signed by other than a member of
the bar of the court, it must be sworn to is eliminated.
A potential problem exists in the provision that a clerk may permit
filing of papers without acknowledgment or proof of service if such
acknowledgment or proof of service is filed promptly thereafter.
There is no reason why an attorney should not file'proof of service at
the time he files a document. If this proposed requirement is not
strictly adhered to, the door may be opened to serving other parties
substantially after the documents are filed.
COMPUTATION AND EXTENSION OF TIME-PROPOSED RULE 26
The proposed rule governing this subject, rule 26, largely adopts
present practice. The only exception is that Saturdays are added to
Sundays and legal holidays as days upon which papers need not be
filed. This change would make court of appeals' practice consistent
with that of the district courts. 121
One matter that deserves consideration is that- most motions for
extensions of time are unopposed and are granted almost as a matter
of course, for they affect no substantial rights and they do not impede
the progress of the case. Many of the appellate courts therefore per-
mit such extensions upon the stipulation of parties. Other courts re-
quire that each such motion be submitted to a judge of the court. There
appears to be little reason in the usual situation for not relieving judges
of this paperwork unless substantial rights may be affected or the
have permitted the filing of papers mailed prior to the date fixed for filing but received
after that date.
120 E.g., D.C. CiR.R. 1 (h).
121 FED. R. Civ. P. 6(a).
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progress of the case may be impeded. There ought to be a provision
added, therefore, to allow extensions by stipulation. At the same time,
a method by which the court, through its clerk, can keep a control over
such extensions so that the court's calendar or the progress of the case
will not suffer should be retained.
Also, some courts of appeals now require that a motion for an
extension of time which is itself late must be accompanied by another
separate motion for leave to file the motion for an extension. This un-
necessary paper work (certificates of service, captions, docket entries,
rulings, etc.) burdens both the court and the litigants. In addition,
attorneys unfamiliar with this practice may find their tardily filed mo-
tions for extension of time returned, without having been considered
on the merits, for lack of a motion for leave to file. The result is that
a second motion must be prepared and the first motion redrafted. The
practice of requiring a second separate motion for leave to file the
first one serves no purpose other than to introduce further delays. The
problem could be easily eliminated by including a provision permitting
the request for permission to file the tardy motion to be included
within the motion itself.
MOTIONS-PROPOSED RULE 27
Proposed rule 27 requires that, unless another form is prescribed
by other rules, an application for an order or other relief must be in
the form of a written motion stating the grounds urged and the relief
sought. Briefs, affidavits, and other supporting papers are to be served
with the motion. One substantial change from present practice in
most circuits is the provision that "motions for procedural orders may
be determined ex parte."122 This provision appears to be a step in the
wrong direction. Even such purely procedural matters as motions for
continuances or for consolidations may be of importance to counsel or
his client in some circumstances, and the importance of the matter
frequently rests upon facts outside the court's knowledge. In addition,
122 This provision follows the practice in the Fifth and Ninth Circuits (although this
practice is not contained in their rules) of acting upon certain procedural motions when
received. Thus, opposing counsel often finds in the same mail a copy of the motion and
the court's order granting the motion. It would take a most extraordinary situation for
opposing counsel to seek at that point a reopening of the matter, although he may have
had an argument to present in opposition prior to the entry of the order.
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the line between procedural and substantive motions is certainly not
clear.
There would appear to be no overriding consideration for not pro-
viding an opportunity to oppose procedural motions, especially since
procedural motions do not ordinarily require immediate disposition.
When urgent matters requiring prompt disposition arise, that urgency
should be the valid basis for ex parte action, not the fact that the
motion is procedural. Altering this provision would not affect the
court's power to act in those situations where ex parte orders are
proper and have been issued in the past. These situations usually in-
volve such urgency as not to afford an opportunity to advise opposing
counsel or give him an opportunity to respond, but ex parte disposition
of motions should not be encouraged in other situations.
The proposed rule permits procedural motions to be disposed of by
a single judge. This is a salutary procedure that most courts have al-
ready instituted. However, it would seem that valuable judge time
could be saved if the clerks were authorized to grant those motions
that are ordinarily granted as of course and are consented to or un-
opposed. The District of Columbia 23 and Eighth124 circuits now
provide such authority; other circuits follow the practice without a
specific rule. It would be unfortunate if such a step toward efficiency
were lost at this point.
Proposed rule 27 omits several provisions now in force in the vari-
ous circuits. No provision is made for motions made in open court;
rather all motions are required to be in writing. Several circuits now
permit open-court motions as exceptions to the general rule that mo-
tions be in writing.12 Although such an exception has limited appli-
cation, it is desirable to permit the court to act promptly upon a matter
when both counsel are present.
The provision in the District of Columbia rules126 that submission
of motions may be expedited by the filing of a waiver of the right to
answer is not included in the proposed rule. However, there is no
practical sanction for failure to file such an answer. And, the waiver
procedure probably would not be followed by the clerks' offices, if the
experience of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit is any guide. Furthermore, if there is need for submission earlier
123 D.C. Cii. R. 31 (k) (2).
124 5m Ci. R. 4(d).
125 E.g., D.C. Cii. R. 31 (a) ; 8TH Cim. R. 3 (c).
120 D.C. CiL R. 31 (i).
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than is. provided by the normal procedure, experience has shown that
counsel can be expected to take affirmative steps to expedite submis-
sion, in cooperation with the clerk and with or without the cooperation
of opposing counsel.
There is no special provision for a motion to dismiss or affirm, such
as is presently provided for in rule 25 (3) of the First Circuit. How-
ever, the proposed rule as now written is sufficiently flexible to provide
for such a motion when needed, and it does not appear advisable to
have a new and separate step prior to a full dress argument on the
merits. It may be helpful in a few cases, but specific provision for it
may encourage its use in a large number of cases where such a motion
should not be filed. Counsel for appellees are likely to see many
strategic advantages in filing a motion to dismiss or affirm when they
have little expectation that it will be granted.One provision that is missing and should be supplied pertains to oral
argument on motions. Several circuits now have provisions advising
counsel that ordinarily there shall be no oral argument on motions.127
This practice appears to be followed by proposed rules 5 (b), 6 (b),
and 18. The court should be authorized to order oral argument in
individual situations where it will be helpful, but this should generally
be discouraged since in the the great majority of instances oral argu-
ment on motions is unnecessary. Certainly the present practice of some
circuits, particularly the Second Circuit, where all motions are called
for oral hearing, is a great waste of court and counsel time and a sig-
nificant contributing factor to the cost of litigation.
PREHEARING CONFERENCE-PROPOSED RULE 33
One innovation is a provision in proposed rule 33 which makes the
prehearing conference available at the court's discretion in all types of
cases. Under prior practice prehearing conferences were available only
in Pr6ceedings for review or enforcement of orders of administrative
agencies, boards,'commissions, or officers. As the Advisory Committee
notes: "[T]he same considerations which make a prehearing desirable
in such proceedings may be present in certain cases on appeal from the
district courts." As with prehearing conferences on the district court
level, the effectiveness of these conferences will depend mainly on the
court. If used well, they may be able to simplify and thus expedite
involved appeals.
127 E.g., lT CIR. R. 26(4); 6TH CiR. R. 18(3).
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REPRODUCED RECORD OR -APPENDIX-PROPOSED RULES 30-32
One of the problems most difficult to resolve in appellate procedure
concerns the manner of presentingto the appellate court those portions
of the record that pertain to the issues raised. At present, there are
basically four different methods used in federal courts of appeals to
select portions of the record to be reproduced and to fix the responsi.
bility and the timing for reproduction and filing. For purposes of dis-
cussion these methods will be designated as "Separate Appendices,"
"Joint Appendix or Deferred Joint Appendix," "Record," and "Xerox
Copies."
In the "Separate Appendices" method, the portions of the record
which each of the parties believes to be pertinent are printed by the
respective parties as appendices to their briefs and filed with the
briefs. 28
In the "Joint Appendix" method,12 9 a joint appendix is printed by
the appellant after each party selects the portions of the record he
wishes to include. The appendix is filed with the appellant's brief. A
variant of the joint appendix method is the "deferred joint appendix"
procedure, 130 in which the designations of the portions of the record
to be printed are filed with the briefs. The printing of the joint appen-
dix is deferred until all briefs are in.
Under the "Record" method' the record is printed under super-
128 This is the method used in most circuits. IsT CIR. R. 23(1); 2D CIR. R. 15(b); 3D
CIR. R. 24(2)(5); 4TH CiR. R. 10; 6i'i CIR. R. 16(2); 7TH CIR. R. 17(a)(c); 5TH
CIR. R. 10. The Eighth Circuit is sometimes called a "record" circuit, for its rules prescribe
the filing of a printed "record" by appellant and of a "supplement to printed record" by
appellee. However, since these are essentially the same as separate appendices, the Eighth
Circuit is here classified with the "appendix" circuits.
120 This is now the standard procedure in one court. D.C. CiR. R. 16. The rules of
four other circuits provide for a joint appendix option to the separate appendix procedure.
The Second, Third, and Sixth Circuits mention only the joint appendix, available by
stipulation or court order, 2D CIa. R. I5(d) ; 3D Ciu. R. 24(6), or by stipulation, 6TH CIt. R.
16(5). The Seventh Circuit priovides for use of a joint appendix, by stipulation or court
order, with the time for filing left to the parties and the court. 7TH CIR. R. 16(d).
130 In one circuit this is specified as an alternative available by stipulation or court
order. D.C. CIR.R. 16(h).
11 See STH CIR. R. 23 (a) ; 9TH CIa. R. 17. This follows the Supreme Court practice. The
Fifth Circuit provides, as an alternative to be employed upon stipulation of the parties,
for the deferral of the printing of the record until after the main briefs are filed (record
to be filed twenty days after appellee's brief), with designations for printing to be made
at the time the respective briefs are filed.
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vision of the court clerk after the parties designate the portions to be
printed, and the time allowed for the filing of briefs does not begin to
run until completion of the printed record.
The "Xerox Copies" method 8 2 permits the use of photostatic or
xerox copies of the original record papers.
Proposed rule 30 adopts the "deferred joint appendix" method as
the routine practice. The parties would be required to file along with
their briefs designations of the parts of the record to be reproduced,
and the joint appendix would be printed and filed only after all briefs
are filed. The briefs are to refer directly to the record, referring to
the document and to the page of the document. As an alternative, a
party may serve and file typewritten or page proof copies of his brief
within the normal time required for the filing of briefs, referring to the
record. Then, fourteen days after the appendix is filed a brief may be
filed pursuant to proposed rule 28 (e) containing references to the
pages of the appendix in place of the initial references to the record.
This procedure would tend to minimize unnecessary printing by
assuring that only material relevant to the finally developed argument
will be designated. On the other hand, it imposes a burden upon the
parties by requiring them to prepare their briefs from the original
transcript, exhibits, and other papers which are cumbersome to utilize
and which are not always readily available, particularly in circuits
encompassing a large geographic area.1'3
The deferred joint appendix has proved to be a useful technique in a
limited class of cases-those having extremely large records and mone-
tary interests substantial enough to warrant the added expense. It has
been particularly helpful in judicial review of complicated and pro-
tracted proceedings before administrative agencies which are heard in
the first instance by the court of appeals. In these cases, since the court
of appeals provides the initial review, the issues frequently are not
adequately crystallized at the commencement of the appellate pro-
ceeding, and the precise formulation of the parties' positions occurs
only in the course of preparation of briefs (a factor which would be
accentuated under proposed rule 15 (a) by the substitution of a simple
notice for the elaborate petition for review required today). The
record in such cases is often very large, and because of the scope of the
182 9TH CM. 10(4).
US This disadvantage can be mitigated by some utilization of the procedure provided
by proposed rule 11(d) for the retention of the record in the district court at least until
argument. See p. 453 supra.
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economic interests involved, each- of the parties in court usually has
been represented before the agency by counsel who has a complete file
of the papers in the case. The disadvantages inherent in deferring the
preparation of the printed record are reduced by these factors, and
may often be clearly outweighed by the desirability of minimizing and
postponing printing until the issues and positions are clearly defined.
None of these conditions is present, however, in the majority of the
appeals from the district courts to the courts of appeals. The issues
have often been well formulated by the parties in the lower court and
the areas of controversy have been brought into focus. The record is
often short and easily manageable; the portions relevant to the appeal
are apparent at the outset. In addition, it is likely that the parties do
not each have a complete set of the papers (particularly as regards
exhibits) before the joint appendix has been compiled. And if counsel
for all parties are not located in the same city as the clerk's office of
the court of appeals, the original record is not readily accessible. These
disadvantages, together with the fact that this method requires more
attorney time, would caution against the adoption of the deferred
joint appendix method as the basic procedure.
The choice of the best method to follow in the usual appeal is not
an easy one. There are reasons favoring the standard "joint appen-
dix" system. It avoids the disadvantage of fragmentation which, when
a transcript of a hearing is involved, can be quite irritating. In addi-
tion, the standard joint appendix satisfies what many believe is the
overriding consideration-the early availability of the reproduced
joint appendix on the basis of which briefs can be prepared.
On the other hand, the standard joint appendix system is objection-
able because, as each party must designate portions of the record to
be reproduced in the appendix at an early date, the reproduced record
is often much larger than it need be. It contains unnecessary material
and often omits necessary material. Moreover, it is a costly procedure.
Experience shows that a lawyer is often not able to ascertain exactly
what parts of the record need be reproduced until he becomes im-
mersed in the case while preparing his brief. Consequently, he will
often over-designate in Order to protect himself. The result is a bulky,
unnecessarily long, and costly reproduced appendix which, neverthe-
less, may still omit pertinent parts of the original r ecord. Still another
difficulty is that, until the appellee reads the appellant's brief and
understands precisely the nature of the arguments, he is in no position
to know what will need to be reproduced. Often, he is surprised by
19661
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the nature of a particular argument and, if he had realized that such
an argument was going to be made, he would have designated different
portions of the record to rebut it. Likewise, the appellant is some-
times surprised by alternative arguments raised by the appellee for
the first time in his brief.
Although the separate appendices method has been criticized be-
cause the court does not obtain a coherent picture of the case, one
might question how great a burden the fragmentary nature of separate
appendices really is. Seven circuits for many years have apparently
found it not to be an impossible burden.8 4 The appellant should be on
notice that he is under the primary obligation to print in the appendix
to his brief all portions of the record relevant to the points he makes
on appeal. If the courts enforce this requirement by refusing to con-
sider assertions of error when the appellant has flagrantly violated this
requirement by not reproducing all parts of the record bearing upon
his arguments, the asserted defect in the separate appendix procedure
will be largely rectified. The portions of the record relevant to the
appellant's argument will be in the appendix to the appellant's brief.
Normally, the appellee would have to reproduce little or no material.
However, if the appellee attempts to defend the judgment upon a
ground not covered by the appellant's brief, it is appropriate for those
parts of the record furnishing the basis for the appellee's argument
to be appended to the appellee's brief. Experience in seven circuits
shows that the separate appendix procedure results in the least amount
of unnecessary material being printed and consequently is the least
costly.
With the competing reasons thus presented, it is apparent that no
solution is ideal. Perhaps the best answer in all but the largest of cases
is the Ninth Circuit's practice of using photostatic or xerox copies of
the original record. This has proven to be cheap and relatively quick.
Unfortunately, however, this writer is not optimistic that the judges in
the other circuits will desire to forego the convenience of an appendix
already culled through by counsel and nicely reprinted and bound for
their almost personal use. Left with a choice between the standard
joint appendix system and the separate appendix system, this writer
134 Note 128 supra. This method was first adopted by the Fourth Circuit in 1938 and
developed by Chief Judge John J. Parker and Clerk Claude M. Dean of that court.
See WRiGHr, FEDERAL CouRTs 408 (1963); 3A BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1592 (Wright ed. 1958) ; Dean, Transcript of Record, in 2 F.R.D. 27 (1943);
Parker, Improving Appellate Methods, 25 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1, 7 (1950).
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would choose the latter; which in his experience has wbrked rathier
well in all but the largest cases. In the large cases the deferred joint
appendix method is probably preferable. Using the deferred joint
appendix method as routine, however, appears to be the least desirable
of all solutions for the vast majority of appellate cases.
BRIEFS-PROPOSED RULES 28, 29; 31, 32
Proposed rule 28 permits filing of a brief for appellant, a brief for
appellee, and a reply brief. The rule then provides that "no further
briefs may be filed except with leave of court." Although such a re-
striction is probably salutary, experience has not shown any difficulty
with the Fifth Circuit's current policy of allowing additional briefs to
be filed at any time, including after argument. The parties should
be able to draw the court's attention to new decisions or new statutes
that may come to their attention; indeed, the court should welcome
such information. Even in those courts that presently have the "no
further briefs" rule, a party wishing to draw attention to a new devel-
opment may file a motion for leave to do so."' As a motion of this
sort has, to this writer's knowledge, never been denied (and, indeed,
it could not be denied without the material first being read), it would
appear to be a totally unnecessary paper transaction.
The Fourth Circuit's practice regarding the designation of parities
in the briefs has been adopted.186 References to parties by their for-
mal designations (appellant, appellee) are to be kept to a minimum.
Rather, descriptive terms such as "the employee," "the taxpayer,"
or "the injured person" are to be used.
Briefs that are reproduced by the standard typographic printing
method are limited to fifty pages. Those that are reproduced by any
other duplicating process may go seventy pages. This adopts the
Fifth Circuit rule 137 recognizing that one can get twenty-five to thirty
per cent more on a page that is printed than on a typewritten page.
Reference in the briefs to the record or appendix has already been
discussed. 8  Briefs and appendices may be reproduced by standard
typographic printing or by any "duplicating or copying process capable
18s This is the practice in the Fourth Circuit although there is no such provision in the
appellate rules of that court.
136 4TH CIR. R. 10.
137 5TH CIR. R. 24(2) (e)., .
18 See p. 459 supra.
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of producing a clear black image on white paper." Standard size of
the pages is prescribed, as is uniform color and form for covers.
Permission to use any method of reproduction that does the job is
a great advance forward. Printing costs have long been one of the
great and largely unnecessary costs of litigation. Under the proposed
rules, one may use, in the advisory committee's words, "any process
capable of producing a neat, readable page." The determination of
what constitutes such a process is left in first instance to the parties
and ultimately to the court. 8 9 This change is being made, the com-
mittee feels, because "recent and impending advances in the arts of
duplicating and copying warrant experimentation with less costly
forms of reproduction than those now authorized." 140 Thus, a litigant
will no longer be limited to typographic printing (as he still is in the
First Circuit and, except on special motion, in the Fourth Circuit)14 1
or even to the multilith method.
Briefs of amici curiae are regulated by proposed rule 29. It provides
that an amicus brief may be filed if consented to by all parties or by
leave of court on motion. The motion should identify the interest of
the applicant and state the reason that a brief of an amicus curiae is
desirable. 42 As the Advisory Committee observes, this proposed rule
reflects the practice in a majority of the circuits today although a
minority would give the court alone, and not the parties, the authority
to permit the filing of such a brief.143
One omitted provision that is included in each of the present appel-
late rules which deal specifically with amicus briefs is an allowance for
the United States, or an officer or agency thereof, to file an amicus brief
without express leave of court or consent of the parties. 44 Sometimes
this right is extended as well to the states and their political subdivi-
sions. 4' The present practice appears sound in recognizing that a spe-
189 Advisory Committee Note to proposed rule 32.
140 Ibid.
141 See note 67 supra.
142 Thus there could not be a repetition of a recent occurrence in the Fifth Circuit
where a prominent attorney filed a brief amicus curiae after argument without identifying
the interest he represented. Chandler v. Davis, 350 F.2d 669 (Sth Cir. 1965).
143 Compare 9T CI. R. 18 (9) and D.C. CiL- R. 18 (i) -with Isr CIR. R. 23 (10).
144 D.C. Cim. R. 18(i) ; IsT CIt R. 23 (10) ; 9TH Cut. R. 18(9) (c). Compare U.S. Sup. CT.
R. 42(4) which permits an amicus brief by the United States without the consent of the
parties.
145 U.S. Sup. Cr. R. 42; isT CILR. 23(10) ; 9TH Cut. R. 18(9) (c).
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cial status is appropriate for the assertion of the public interest and
that there is little danger of the privilege being abused. This writer
finds it hard to believe that a court would deny such a motion and has
been unable to find any historical instance of such a denial. It would
thus appear unnecessary to require that permission be obtained in
order to file such a brief.
ORAL ARGUMENT-PROPOSED RULE 34
Proposed rule 34 incorporates the practice generally followed at the
present time in the various circuits. Each side is allowed thirty minutes
for argument, but it is provided that a court by rule may change that
limit.
One significant aspect of this topic that was not touched upon by the
Advisory Committee relates to the circumstance in which less than
three judges actually appear to hear the oral argument. The current
practice in a number of the circuits is to seek agreement from counsel
in open court that the absent judge may participate in the decision by
reading the briefs and, in some instances, also by listening to a re-
corded tape of the oral argument. Many lawyers feel strongly that all
judges who participate in the decision should be present for oral argu-
ment,1 46 and yet find it a delicate matter to raise an objection under
the current practice.
This problem raises some troublesome issues, both legal and prac-
tical. The relevant statute 4 7 provides generally that "cases and con-
troversies shall be heard and determined by a court or division of not
more than three judges," and further that a "majority of the number
of judges authorized to constitute a court or division thereof . . .
shall constitute a quorum." This provision, while authorizing a
quorum of two members, does not in its terms authorize an absent
member to decide what he has not heard. The policy decision has been
made that the oral argument is an integral part of the appellate sys-
tem. Its prime advantages are to permit the judge to convey to counsel
the questions and problems which remain after study of the brief, and
to furnish counsel an opportunity to respond. 48 To permit a judge to
participate in the decision when he has not had the benefit of this
146 Compare Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 21 (1938) ; Morgan v. United States,
298 U.S. 468, 481 (1936).
14728 U.S.C. §§ 46(c), (d) (1964).
148 See Cutler, Appellate Cases: The Falue of Oral Argument, 44 A.B.A.J. 831 (1958).
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,argument is inconsistent with the policy determination as well as de-
structive of this advantage.
EN BANC DETERMINATIONS-PROPOSED RULE 35
Proposed rule 35 specifies two circumstances under which hearing
or rehearing en banc may be ordered: First, when consideration by
the full court is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of its de-
cisions, and, second, when the proceeding involves a question of excep-
tional importance. These circumstances are appropriate, but consid-
eration ought also be given to providing an en banc proceeding when
the decision of the court of appeals conflicts with a decision of one or
more other courts of appeals. Conflict in the decisions of the courts of
appeals for different circuits is not a rare occurrence, and usually the
only practicable means of resolving the conflict is to petition the Su-
preme Court for a writ of certiorari. 149 If, as happens reasonably
often, the Supreme Court declines to hear the case, the result is that
something may be "legal" in some circuits and "illegal" in others. It
is thus possible that en banc proceedings might be used effectively in
regard to cases which, although presenting difficult and controversial
legal problems, may not be of sufficient national importance to warrant
consideration by the Supreme Court. Of course, en banc consideration
would not necessarily result in an elimination of conflicts among the
circuits, but such decisions could be expected to carry more weight
as precedent in future cases arising in other circuits and for this reason
could prove useful as a means of achieving greater uniformity through-
out the various circuits.
Under the proposed rules, a majority of the circuit judges in regu-
lar active service may order en banc hearing or rehearing. This is
consistent with existing practice,150 except that the Ninth Circuit re-
quires the assent of a majority of the panel assigned to the case before
a vote of all active judges will be taken,151 The Ninth Circuit exception
permits two members of the panel to block en banc hearing or rehear-
ing even if it is desired by a majority of the active judges of the
circuit. The proposed rule appears to be the better practice.
149 This is 'One of the possible criteria for the grant of certiorari. U.S. Sup. CT. R.
19(1) (b).,
15028 U.S.C. § 46(c); SD CI. R. 4(3); 6TH CIR. R. 3(2); STU CIR. R. 4(a); 9T11 CIR.
R. 23 (5)
151 9TH CIR. R. 23(5).
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Consideration should be given to making uniform the treatmient'of
the consequences that result where a panel reverses the district court,
a rehearing en banc is ordered, and'the full court ends up equally
divided. The Second Circuit has held that the grant of rehearing auto-
matically vacates the panel division and therefore, the even division of
the en banc court operates to affirm the decision of the district court.152
Although there appears to be no inherent advantage to either this rule
or one that would permit the panel decision to stand, the rule should
be uniform.
JUDGMENT-PROPOSED RULE 36
Notation on the court of appeals' docket constitutes the entry of
judgment under proposed rule 36. The clerk is to mail "promptly" a
copy of the judgment and opinion, if any, to all parties. 'This scheme
poses two problems. First, a party in many, cases is represented by
more than one attorney. Under the existing lariguage, service would
be required only on" one of the attorneys for each party, and the at-
torney served might not be the principal attorney in charge of de-
ciding such matters as whether to seek reconsideration of the decision,
whether to file a petition for writ of certiorari, or whether to file a
bill of costs. In view of the time limitations imposed upon such
actions, it would appear that where a party is represented by more
than one counsel, the clerk should mail opinions and judgments to each
address.
The second problem arises from the provision that the clerk shall
mail a copy of the opinion and judgment "promptly." The rule should
be more specific. It should require that these items be mailed on the
date received by the clerk. Experience has shown that in some of the
courts of appeals, opinions are not available for distribution to counsel
at the time of filing and may not be distributed until as much as a week
later. In view of the short time available for requesting rehearing,
there should be no delay between the filing of an opinion and its
distribution to counsel.
On infrequent occasions a problem has arisen regar"ding the filing
of either a petition for rehearing or a petition for certiorari because
the court of appeals may enter-an order in lieu of judgment or a judg-
ment of reversal (or for that matter affirming a distiict court judg-
ment) stating that an opinion will f6llow. Under such circumstances,
102 Farrand Optical Co. v. United States,3.7 F.2d'75, 886' (2d Cir. 1963). "
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it is impossible to know whether further review should be sought until
the opinion is written. And the time for certiorari runs from the date
of judgment not the date of the opinion. While this situation is quite
infrequent, it can be taken care of by a simple provision that if the
court decides the case by an order which indicates that an opinion will
follow, no judgment is to be entered until the opinion is received by the
clerk, unless the court expressly finds that an emergency exists necessi-
tating an exception.
Finally, proposed rule 36 provides that should the opinion direct
settlement of the terms of the judgment, the judgment is not to be
signed and entered until its precise terms are settled. This is a common
problem in cases involving enforcement of agency orders.1 3 The
proposed rule would have entry of judgment delayed until approval
of the final form.
PETITION FOR REHEARING--PROPOSED RULE 40
Proposed rule 40 retains the basic approach in the existing rules
but differs in several important details. The time provided for a peti-
tion for rehearing is fourteen days after the entry of judgment. Ex-
perience has shown this period to be too short.154 Frequently the opin-
ion and judgment are not received until several days after judgment
has been entered.15 5 Another week may be needed for printing and
mailing the petition. Government counsel usually must clear any action
they propose to take through appropriate official channels, and counsel
for private parties must have time to obtain proper authorization
from their clients. Sometimes inquiries must be made to determine the
importance of the decision. If the court's decision goes in a direction
unanticipated by either party, extensive research may be required be-
fore a petition can be adequately prepared. For these reasons, the time
for filing a petition for rehearing would be better set at twenty-one
days.
There is no requirement, such as is found in all but one of the exist-
ing rules, that the petition for rehearing include or be accompanied by
a certificate of counsel stating that it is filed in good faith and not for
1 5 3 STERN & GREsMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACrICE 203 (3rd ed. 1962).
154 See pp. 467-68 supra.
155 In the Fourth Circuit, for example, the opinion is not sent to the printer until after
judgment is entered. The opinion and judgment are therefore not mailed to opposing
counsel until after the opinion has returned from the printer.
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purposes of delay.' 5 Such a requirement should be included, for, at
a minimum, it serves as a reminder to counsel of his ethical duty to
refrain from filing pleadings solely for purposes of delay, and it should
serve as some deterrent, however slight, to abuse of the practice of
filing petitions for rehearing.
INTEREST, DAMAGES FOR DELAY, COSTS-PROPOSED RULES 30, 37-39
When a money judgment in a civil case is affirmed, interest, estab-
lished by law, is to run from the date of the district court judgment.
Should the judgment be modified or reversed with direction to enter
a money judgment, the mandate is to contain instructions with respect
to interest. This rule should clear up the confusion as to whether
upon affirmance interest is to run from the initial judgment.1 57 In ad-
dition, it should remove the problem of the current rule that, where a
court of appeals directs entry of a money judgment, but makes no pro-
vision for interest, the district court is powerless to add interest to the
judgment. 158 Now, the appellate court will be reminded to make pro-
vision for interest in the mandate. And where the matter is overlooked,
a party who believes himself entitled to interest will be able to seek
recall of the mandate for determination of the question. The Advisory
Committee Note so indicates.
One problem that is perpetuated by the Advisory Committee Note
concerns the legal authority to award interest on a judgment. The
Note cites 28 U.S.C. § 1961 and § 2411, which contain the basic
authority for such interest. But this authority has been seriously limi-
ted in cases involving the United States 59 by the provisions of 31
U.S.C. § 724a.160 This latter provision should also be cited in the
Note to prevent needless errors that will absorb the time of litigants
and the court.
In accordance with statutory authority161 and normal current prac-
tice' 62 proposed rule 38 provides that if an appeal delays proceedings
156 E.g., 4TH CiR. R. 19; 6TH CuL.R. 22(2).
157 See Blair v. Durham, 139 F.2d 260 (6th Cir. 1943).
158 Briggs v. Pennsylvania R.R., 334 U.S. 304 (1948).
159 One-third of all civil appeals filed during the past three years involved the federal
government. 1965 REPORT p. 114.
160 See United States v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 285 F.2d 381 (8th Cir.
1960) ; Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R. v. United States, 206 F. Supp. 795 (S.D. Iowa 1962).
16128 U.S.C. § 1912 (1964).
102 D.C. CiR. R. 23; 2D CiR. R. 26(b); 3n C. R. 34(2); 91TH CI. R. 24(2).
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on the, district c6urt judgment and appears to have been taken merely
for delay, the court may award just damages and single or double
costs to the appellee. The courts have been very reluctant-perhaps
too much so-to use this provision.163
Costs are generally awarded to the winning party unless otherwise
ordered by the court. The Advisory Committee Note makes clear that
this provision applies only to costs awarded under the general author-
ization statute.10 Special cost statutes that provide for different re-
sults in specific situationg are to govern where applicable.""
28 U.S.C. § 2412 provides that the United States should not be
subject to costs unless specifically authorized by statute. This is an
archaic principle which has outlived its usefulness, and the possibility
of changing this anomalous situation is apparently being considered by
the Department of Justice. 6  The present practice, and that adopted
by the proposed rules, attempts to balance the rights of parties. If
the courts cannot award costs against the government, they refuse to
award costs to the government although a private litigant would be
awarded costs in a similar situation.
The validity of this practice, however, along with the corresponding
proposed rule, is open to question. As the Advisory Committee recog-
nizes, the United States is entitled to recover costs just as is a private
litigant. 67 While costs are generally discretionary, the United States
should be subject to the same discretion, exercised upon the same
principles, as is a private party. 6" It thus appears that the present rules
purport to deprive the United States of a substantive right to receive
costs on the same basis as a private litigant. This practice should not
be perpetuated in the proposed uniform rules. Moreover, the present
practice does not achieve its purpose. The fact that a litigant who
loses to the government need not pay costs is of little consolation to
the litigant who wins against the government but is unable to get costs.
163 See Mason v. Simmer Lake Irr. Dist., 216 F.2d 609 (9th Cir. 1954) (no damages even
where appeal frivolous because not done in previous cases). But see Lowe v. Willacy,
239 F.2d 179 (9th Cir. 1956) (damages granted because appeal was frivolous).
164 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (1964).
165 It may be assumed that the statutory limitation on costs recoverable for printing
briefs in admiralty appeals comes within this caveat. 28 U.S.C. § 1923 (1964).
166 Speech by Assistant Attorney General John W. Douglas to Portland, Oregon, Chap-
ter, Federal Bar Association, May 3, 1965.
167 Advisory Committee Note to proposed rule 39 (b).
168 In United States v. Verdier, 164 U.S. 213 (1896), the Court held that the government
could not be deprived of jts right to interest.
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The proposed rule makes one significant improvement in current
practice. It permits the cost of printing briefs to be taxed along with
the cost of printing appendices. This follows the more liberal present
practice of four circuits.1 9 As long as we operate upon a theory of
taxing costs to the unsuccessful party, there is no reason not to include
the cost of printing briefs.
Moreover, the proposed rule goes further and permits the taxing
of the actual cost of printing or otherwise reproducing the briefs and
appendices, limited to rates generally charged for such work. This is
an improvement over the practice in at least some courts where the
costs permitted reflect a pricing structure of a by-gone era. 70 It may
be a further improvement to limit the recovery to the cost that would
be incurred by use of multilithing. Rule 32 (a) of the proposed rules
would authorize multilithing, and it would seem appropriate that the
rule involving costs encourage the use of this process. It would be
unfair to disadvantage the losing party by permitting the winning
party-perhaps the more affluent of the two-to charge the cost of a
more expensive process.
Often the largest part of the costs taxed is the cost of the appendix.
In analyzing the problem of who bears the cost of the appendix, one
must distinguish between the initial incidence and the final incidence
of cost. Following the terms of some of the present rules,171 the pro-
posed rules provide that the appellant will bear the initial expense of
printing the appendix as designated by both parties, with one excep-
tion. The appellant may shift to the appellee the initial expense of
printing material designated by the latter, if he advises the appellee of
his belief that such material is "unnecessary for the determination of
the issues presented"; in that event the appellee "shall advance the cost
of including such parts." One problem that has developed under this
practice is the tendency of appellants to print less than is needed to
decide the case. The tendency may continue under the proposed rules
because an appellant can designate little and can require the appellee
to pay initially for all which the latter designates by simply "advising"
him that the additional material is unnecessary. While there is no pro-
vision for challenging the appellant's "advice" at the time it is given,
169 D.C. CIR. R. 20(d); lsT Cm. R. 31(4) ; 3D CIR. R. 35(4); 4TH CIR. R. 21(4)..
170 For' illustrations of the co~ts now allowed by some couits see 1ST Cim. R. 31(4);
3D CIR. R. 35(8).
171 E.., D.C. CIR. 16(a).
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an appellee who prevails on the merits can recover costs at the end of
the case.
The same is not true, however, for litigation involving the govern-
ment. As long as the rule prevails that there be no costs allowed for
or against the United States unless authorized by statute, the initial
allocation of the printing expense is also the final one. In the Supreme
Court, for example, the appellant in government cases must pay for
printing the entire record, regardless of the source of the designations,
and this writer is unaware of any judicial shifting of this burden on
the grounds of improper or unnecessary designation. Some courts of
appeals using the record or joint appendix procedure, however, have
interposed these grounds in government cases to shift expenses. The
District of Columbia Circuit, on the other hand, permits no question-
ing of the appellant's advice that the appellee's designation is unneces-
sary. But, since the initial allocation in government cases is the final
one, the rules should provide that the appellee in a government case
may challenge the appellant's "advice" as to the need for the material
designated by the appellee. This challenge should be decided either
immediately or deferred until the merits of the appeal are decided at
which time the court probably would be better able to determine
relevance. Such court supervision would appear to be valid on the
theory that it does not constitute a taxation of costs, but simply an
imposition upon the appellant of a burden which he should have as-
sumed in the first place.
BAIL-PROPOSED RULE 9
The proposed rules generally follow the present practice of Rules
38(c) and 46(a) (2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
But it is expressly provided that an application for bail pending appeal
of a conviction must ordinarily be first made to the district court. If
the district court fails to grant the applicant relief to which he con-
siders himself entitled, the judge is to "state with particularity the
reasons for the denial or for the refusal of the relief sought." This
should remove a difficulty found by the appellate courts in situations
where a district court fails to state its reasons.1 2 Upon denial in the
trial court, the appellant may apply for bail to the court of appeals
or to a judge thereof, showing his application to the trial court and its
172 See, e.g., Rhodes v. United States, 275 F.2d 78 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 912
(1960) ; United States v. Williams, 253 F.2d 144 (7th Cir. 1958).
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denial, or the reason that application to the trial court is not prac-
ticable. The application shall also state the reasons for the relief re-
quested and the facts relied upon. If the facts are subject- to dispute,
the application is to be supported by affidavits or other sworn state-
ments. This procedure might be improved by two additional provi-
sions: In the event of a dispute of fact in the district court, the district
court shall grant a prompt hearing thereon; and should a subsequent
application be made to the appellate court, the district court upon
notice of the application shall transmit the record of the factual hear-
ing.
Provision is also made for an appeal from "an order respecting
bail entered prior to an appeal from a judgment of conviction." Such
an appeal is to be expedited and heard without the necessity of
briefs. This provision recognizes that, under the rationale of Cohen
v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.,17 orders revoking bail174 or refusing
to extend bail limits 75 are appealable, and that "relief in this type of
case must be speedy if it is to be effective."'' 6
HABEAS CORPUS-PROPOSED RULES 21, 22
Proposed rule 21 provides that an application for a writ of habeas
corpus is to be made to the district court for 'the district in which
the applicant is in custody. If made to an appellate judge or court,
the application ordinarily is to be transferred to the appropriate
district court. This makes present practice explicit. The rule then
goes on to provide that, should the district court deny the application,
renewal of the application before a circuit judge is "not favored";
instead the remedy is appeal. The Advisory Committee notes that
28 U.S.C. § 2241 seems to authorize a second original writ to an
appellate judge or court. But as 28 U.S.C. § 2253 provides for
appeal from the denial of a writ, the second application-is a waste of
time.
The rule also prescribes that, before an appeal can be taken in
a proceeding involving detention by order of a state court, a certificate
of probable cause must be obtained in accordance with section 2253.
173 337 U.S. 541, 54547 (1949).
174 United States v. DiPietro, 302 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1962); Carbo v. United States,
288 F.2d 282 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 861 (1961).
175 United States v. Foster, 278 F.2d 567 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 834 (1960).
176 Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951).
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The certificate must first be sought from a district judge. If denied,
the applicant may then request issuance of a certificate from a circuit
judge. If he addresses his 'application to the appellate court, it is
deemed to be addressed to a judge or judges of that court. The rule
expressly states that an appeal may not be taken unless a certificate
of probable cause is issued.
Although section 2253 does require the issuance of a certificate
of probable cause, it does not require that there be filed a second
piece of paper specifically denominated a request for a certificate.
Thus, the requirement that a second request be filed is a useless for-
mality and may be a potential trap to substantial rights. It can easily
be eliminated by providing that, if an appellant does not file a specific
request for a certificate, his notice of appeal should be deemed to
be such a request addressed to the court of appeals and considered
accordingly. 17' This will solve another problem as well. Some circuits,
for example the Seventh, have held that, where the certificate of
probable cause had been refused by the court of appeals before the time
to appeal had expired, the court was without the power to grant the
application and the appeal was dismissed. 78
The proposed rules also provide that, pending review of a
decision refusing a writ of habeas corpus, the prisoner is not to be
moved except on order of court. Pending review of a decision dis-
charging such a writ, the prisoner may be remanded to the custody
from which he was taken or he may be released on recognizance with
surety. Pending review of a decision discharging a prisoner, he "shall
be enlarged" with or without bail. The only qualification that might
be made is to the apparent requirement that the prisoner be given
his freedom, with or without bail, pending review of a grant of a
writ. Favorable action on the part of the district court lends great
weight to the argument that the prisoner should not be detained a
moment longer. There are circumstances, however, which might make
continued custody a wiser decision. Illness, mental difficulty, or out-
standing warrants for other offenses are typical situations in which
the prisoner might be better off continuing the service of his sentence
177Under proposed rule 3(a) the notice of appeal is to~be transmitted to the clerk of
the iourt'of appeals when it is filed.
178 See United States ex rel. Geach v. Ragen, 231 F.2d 455 (7th Cir. 1956) ; Ex parte
Whistler, 154 F.2d 500 (7th Cir.), cert denied; 327 U.S. 797 (1946) ; United States ex rel.
White v. Ragen, 153 F.2d 778 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 802 (1946).
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1ending appeal. Accordingly, discretionary enlirgement sdems pre-
ferable.
APPEALS IN FORMA PAUPERIS-PROPOSED RULES 23, 24
Proposed rule 23 requires that an initial forma pauperis application
be made to the district court. If granted, the party may proceed
on appeal without payment of fees or costs or the giving of security
for fees or costs. If denied, the district court is to state the reasons
for the denial. Upon the denial of the application by the district
court, the appellant may move in the court of appeals for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis. But he must do so thirty days after
entry of the order of denial by the district court. That means that
hewill have to move in the court of appeals usually prior to docketing
and sometimes prior to the expiration of the time for the filing of a
notice of appeal.
No provision is now made for review of administrative agency
proceedings in forma pauperis. Some agency actions significantly
affect the rights of individuals.179 Where review proceedings are
brought in the district courts, the proposed rule would permit pro-
ceeding in forma pauperis in an appeal taken from any ruling entered.
But many agency review actions start directly in the appellate court.
There should also be a right to obtain such review in forma pauperis.
The statutory authorization, 28 U.S.C. § 1915, is broad enough to
cover such situations.
WRITS OF MANDAMUS AND PROHIBITION DIRECTED TO A JUDGE
AND OTHER EXTRAORDINARY WRITS-PROPOSED RULE 20
This proposed rule sets forth the procedure for obtaining from
the appellate court extraordinary writs, particularly 'those directed
to lower judges. A petition must be filed containing a statement of
the facts, issues presented, relief sought, and a statement of the
"reasons why the extraordinary writ of mandamus or prohibition
should issue." This could be sharpened by requiring an additional
statement why the relief sought is not available' through regular ap-
pellate processes. Although such a requirement is not in the present
179E.g., 72 Stat. 776 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1422 -(1964) (grant and renewal of pilot's
license); 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§lss1(a) (3), (b) (2) (i964) (discriminatory dis-
chirge on account of union activity) ; 49 Stit. 62S (1935), as amended, 42 'U.S.C. § 402
(1964) (social security benefits).
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rules of the courts of appeals, it is contained in the Supreme Court
rules.10 This requirement would serve to emphasize the extraordinary
character of the writ and would thereby tend to discourage the
undesirable efforts, too frequently made, of abusing the extraordinary
writs.
In addition, there should be required either a statement that an
application had been made to the district court for a certification
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (b) (permitting interlocutory appeals) and
was unsuccessful, or the reasons that an application was inappropriate.
Ordinarily, relief by way of mandamus or prohibition is not granted
where other remedies are available, and an interlocutory appeal under
section 1292 (b) would in many instances afford an adequate remedy,
and might therefore preclude relief by extraordinary writ.'81 This
procedural requirement was recently adopted by the Third Circuit. 82
However, it must be recognized that there are circumstances in
which no application need be made for a certification under section
1292 (b) because relief thereunder would not be appropriate. For
example, mandamus is available to enforce a party's right to a jury
trial, even though there is no "controlling issue of law" or no "sub-
stantial ground for a difference of opinion."' 83
In such circumstances, the petitioner should not need to apply
for a section 1292 (b) certificate but should only need to show that
an appeal under that statute was inappropriate.
The proposed rule as written does require that all parties answer
the petition. This is faulty for two reasons. First, the trial judge
should not be required to answer but should be given a choice as
to whether he wishes to become involved.184 The elimination of a
duty to answer will avoid the "unfortunate consequence of making
the judge a litigant"'8 5 in cases where he is not a real party in interest.
Secondly, it would save everyone's time and effort if the appellate
court would first examine the petition to determine whether it presents
180 U.S. Sup. CT. R. 31(2).
181 See Ex parte Watkins, 260 F.2d 548 (5th Cir. 1958). Compare Van Dusen v. Barrack,
376 U.S. 612, 615 n.3 (1964).
182 Rapp v. Van Dusen, 350 F.2d 806 (3d Cir. 1965).
183 See In re Watkins, 271 F.2d 771 (5th Cir. 1959). See also Dairy Queen v. Wood,
369 U.S. 469 (1962), where there was no discussion of the possibility of permissive appeal.
1 184 A duty to answer exists in certain of the present rules. 3D Ci. 19(3) ; 6TH CIR. R1.
29(4) ; 7TH CIR. R. 19(c). But those requirements pertain to situations where the court
issues an order to show cause, a procedure not included in the proposed uniform rules.
185 Ex pare Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 260 (1947).
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a case sufficient to require an answer. This is in effect the practice
of those circuits not requiring an answer until there has been is-
sued an order to show cause, and this practice has much to commend it.
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW AND ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDINGS-
PROPOSED RULES 15-19
The current uniform rule, taken from the Hobbs Act, 86 requires
that administrative review proceedings commence with a petition
for review which shall contain "a concise statement, in barest out-
line, of the nature of the proceedings as to which relief is sought,
the facts upon which relief is sought, and the relief prayed." The pro-
posed new rule retains the petition for review in name but requires only
that it specify the parties seeking review, the respondent, and the
order or part thereof to be reviewed. Thus, the petition for review is
substantially turned into a mere notice of appeal. This is subject to the
qualification that, where a statute expressly requires more, the petition
is to conform with the statute. Thus, those review proceedings that
come directly within the Hobbs Act authorization would still require
the broader petition. 87 But review proceedings taken under statutes
that do not now require the broader petition would be subject only
to notice pleading.
Although one may agree with the Advisory Committee that "there
is no effective, reasonable way of obliging petitioners to come to the
real issues before those issues are formulated in the brief," this does
not eliminate the desirability of some specification of error in the
appeal process. Such specification can serve, as it does now, as an
aid in determining what portion of the voluminous records often
involved in administrative proceedings should be printed. Early spe-
186 64 Stat. 1130 (1950), 5 U.S.C. § 1034 (1964).
187 64 Stat. 1129 (1950), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 1032 (1964), provides direct court of
appeals' review for (a) final orders of the FCC made reviewable under the Com-
munications Acts § 14, 66 Stat. 718 (1952), 47 U.S.C. § 402 (a) (1964) ; (b) certain orders
of the Secretary of Agriculture under the Packers and Stockyards Act § 204, 42 Stat. 162
(1921), as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 9 (1964), and under the Perishable Agricultural Com-
modities Act § 12, 48 Stat. 587 (1934), as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 499(g) (c) (1964) ; (c)
certain orders of the Federal Maritime Commission under the Shipping Act § 31, 39 Stat.
738 (1916), 46 U.S.C, § 830 (1964), and the Intercoastal Shipping Act, 47 Stat. 1425
(1933), as amended, 46 U.S.C. §§ 84-48 (1964); and (d) certain orders of the AEC
under the Atomic Energy Act § 189, 68 Stat. 955 (1954), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2239
(1964).
478 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54: p. 431
cification also enables respondents to begin work on their briefs at an
early stage and on occasion provides a basis for the agency and the
parties to resolve the controversy without the necessity for comple-
tion of the review process. The petition should also contain allegations
with respect to venue and jurisdiction so that challenges on these
grounds may be resolved expeditiously on motion, rather than after
the entire briefing process has been completed.
. The fallacy in assimilating administrative review proceedings to
appeals from the district court is that, while in the district court
battle lines have been drawn and issues clarified, this often does not
exist in administrative proceedings. An appeal from a multi-party,
multi-issue comparative or rulemaking proceeding, where the record
could run many volumes, is a quite different affair. And even in those
appeals from the district court where the appellant does not order
the entire transcript, proposed rule 10 (b) would require a statement
of the issues intended to be raised on appeal. In administrative pro-
ceedings the burden will probably fall on the prehearing conference
provided by proposed rule 33 to clarify the issues so that the rest
of the case might go on efficiently. Thus, the statement of issues is
merely postponed and more court time is taken.
The petition for review does not call for an answer, but an answer
is called for in response to an application for enforcement. The reason
is that there is no purpose in preparing and forwarding a record in
eases where the application for enforcement is not contested.188
One of the knottiest problems in this area is the service to be
made upon interested parties. Effort should be made to see that all
who have a genuine interest in the proceedings receive notice. But
in many administrative proceedings there may be hundreds of persons
who have written letters or comments to the agency but have not
participated in any meaningful way. The proposed rule solves the
problem by requiring that service be made upon all "who shall have
been admitted to participate in the proceedings before the agency."18
This seems somewhat restrictive since a person, believing that another
party at the agency, level would sufficiently represent his interests,
may have filed formal comments without participating. Perhaps the
best answer is to require a simple notice to be sent to all parties who
filed formal comments or appeared at the administrative hearing.
:188 See Advisory Committee Note to proposed rule 17 (a).
189 Proposed rule 15 (c).
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The record, which can either by filed with the court or retained by
the agency during the review proceedings, is to consist of the original
papers before the agency. The rule gives a sufficient amount of flex-
ibility in the handling of the record to permit needed administrative
proceedings to continue during the review process.
REVIEW OF DECISIONS OF THE TAX COURT-
PROPOSED RULES 13, 14
Review of Tax Court decisions are to be taken by filing a petition
for review, as is required by26 U.S.C. § 7483. But proposed rule
13 (a) would require that the petition be "in the form of a notice
of appeal." This constitutes: a change from current practice. 190 As
with administrative review "generally, this writer believes that the
alteration in form is a mistake. The petition for review should
include a statement of facts necessary to establish venue and a brief
statement of the issues and the taxable periods'with respect to which
review is sought. Tax Court cases are subject to special venue require-
ments' 9' which do not apply to court of appeals' review of district
court matters. It is only by the pleading of the facts necessary to
establish venue that a court and government counsel can ascertain
at the beginning whether a case has been brought in the correct court.
If not, it would be to the benefit of all to have the case dismissed
before counsel or the court invest much time in the matter.
The statement of issues is necessary in Tax Court appeals for
the same reason that it is of significance in administrative appeals
generally. There are often many issues before the Tax Court and,
without the statement, it is not known until the appellant's brief
is filed what issues are raised. Designations for an appendix, early
brief preparation, and other matters will be disadvantaged. More-
over, before the Tax Court there are quite often various issues-affect-
ing various tax years. And where issues have been decided partially
for and partially against the Commissioner,I unless he knows which
year or years are the subject of appeal, he is in no position to know
what, if any, cross-petitions to file. The taxpayer is in the same
position if the Commissioner petitions first.
The proposed rule further provides that the running of the time
for appeal is tolled by a timely motion to vacate or revise a decision
100 D.C. Cia. R. 36(a); 4TH CIR. R. 28(1) ; 7TH CIR. R. 13; 9TH CIR..R: 29.
191 INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, § 7482(b).
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made pursuant to the Tax Court Rules. The Advisory Committee
states that this incorporates "the settled teaching of the case law."102
The language, however, is not broad enough to cover motions not
directly calling for the decision to be vacated or revised, such as
motions to amend findings of fact. The Eighth Circuit has held,9 3
for example, that a motion to revise Tax Court findings of fact tolls
the running of the time for appeal on the ground that, if the motion
were granted, it would necessarily require vacating the decision. It
would seem advantageous to incorporate this ruling in the proposed
rule. It would then be parallel with the rule, applicable to district
court appeals,194 which provides for the tolling of the appeal period
by a timely motion to amend or make additional findings of fact,
whether or not an alteration of judgment would be required if the
motion were granted.
MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS
The remaining provisions of the proposed rules with which liti-
gants would be involved would regulate voluntary dismissal of ap-
peals, 195 substitution of parties,19 6 and a notification to the Attorney
General of cases involving constitutional questions where the United
States is not a party. 97 Further, there are provisions regulating the
duties of clerks 9" and attorneys before the appellate courts. 109 The
rules also permit the various courts of appeals to promulgate rules
of practice not inconsistent with the uniform rules,200 and, with one
exception, to suspend the rules in the interest of expediting decision
upon any matter before it, or for any good cause shown.20' Finally,
192 Citing Denholm & McKay Co. v. Commissioner, 132 F.2d 242 (1st Cir. 1942);
Helvering v. Continental Oil Co., 63 App. D.C. 5, 68 F.2d 750 (1933); Burnet v. Lexing-
ton Ice & Coal Co., 62 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1933); Griffith v. Commissioner, 50 F.2d 782 (7th
Cir. 1931).
193 Robert Louis Stevenson Apartments, Inc. v. Commissioner, 337 F.2d 681 (8th Cir.
1964).
194 Proposed rule 4(a).
195 Proposed rule 42.
196 Proposed rule 43.
197 Proposed rule 44.
198 Proposed rule 45.
199 Proposed rule 46.
200 Proposed rule 47.
201 Proposed rule 2.
PROPOSED APPELLATE RULES
there are formal provisions governing the scope of the rules20 2 and
their title.203
CONCLUSION
The Proposed Uniform Rules of Federal Appellate Procedure will
work a tremendous advance over the present system which is com-
prised of eleven different sets of rules. The proposed rules should
bring more certainty to those circuits where procedure is now to a
great extent ad hoc. Hopefully, as an incidental benefit, the rules
will also alleviate to some extent the problems of delay and expense
that now plague the federal courts.
Once Congress has authorized uniform appellate rules the Judicial
Conference, acting under present authority, can continue to study
and improve the initial set of rules, as it has the civil, criminal, -and
admiralty rules. In this way appellate procedure will approach the
ideal set forth by Congress: "simplicity in procedure, fairness in
administration, the just determination of litigation, and the elimina-
tion of unjustifiable expense and delay.' 20 4
202 Proposed rule 1.
203 Proposed rule 48.
20428 U.S.C. § 331 (1964).
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